SECURITY MEASUREMENT FOR LTE/SAE NETWORK DURING SINGLE RADIO VOICE CALL CONTINUITY (SRVCC). by Jamil, Nazia
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
 
FACULTY OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
TELECOMMUNICATION ENGINEERING 
 
 
Nazia Jamil 
 
 
 
 
SECURITY MEASUREMENT FOR LTE/SAE NETWORK DURING SINGLE 
RADIO VOICE CALL CONTINUITY (SRVCC). 
 
 
 
 
Master´s thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Technology submitted for 
inspection, Vaasa, 20 May, 2014. 
 
 
Supervisor Professor    Mohammed Salem Elmusrati 
Instructor M. Sc. (Tech.)    Tobias Glocker 
2 
 
ACKNOWLEDEMENT 
I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Mohammed Salem Elmusrati and 
instructor Tobias Glocker who agreed to supervise and instruct me during my thesis 
work. I would like to share the credit of my work with Tobias Glocker who has taken 
pain to go through the thesis work and make necessary corrections as and when needed. 
I am indebted to my faculty for their cooperation and support. My heartfelt thanks to my 
husband Nadeem and children Eshal & Umer, without their cooperation and sacrifice it 
would not have been possible. And I am grateful to my siblings, friends and well-
wishers for their best wishes and moral support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS       Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT             2 
ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... 6 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... 14
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 15
2. CELLULAR COMMUNICATION ........................................................................... 17
2.1. Cellular Technology ............................................................................................ 17
2.2. Channel ................................................................................................................ 18
2.3. Operation of Cellular System .............................................................................. 19
2.4. Generation of Cellular Network .......................................................................... 19
3. BASIC SECURITY CONCEPTS .............................................................................. 23
3.1. Security ................................................................................................................ 23
3.2. Information Security ............................................................................................ 23
3.3. Design Principles of Security .............................................................................. 25
3.4. Security Vulnerability, Threat Risk & Attack ..................................................... 26
3.4.1. Threat and Risk Assessment ......................................................................... 27
3.4.2. Attack ........................................................................................................... 28
3.5. Basic Concept of Cryptography .......................................................................... 29
3.6. Symmetric or Conventional Cryptography ......................................................... 31
3.6.1. Stream Cipher ............................................................................................... 31
3.6.2. Block Cipher ................................................................................................. 32
3.6.3. Comparison of Symmetric Encryption Algorithms ...................................... 35
3.6.4. Problems with Symmetric Encryption .......................................................... 36
3.7. Modern or Asymmetric Cryptography ................................................................ 36
3.7.1. Digital Signature ........................................................................................... 37
3.7.2. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) ................................................................... 38
3.8. Hybrid Cryptosystem ........................................................................................... 39
3.9. Hash Functions .................................................................................................... 39
3.9.1. One-Way Hash Function .............................................................................. 39
3.9.2. Keyed Hash Function ................................................................................... 40
4 
 
3.10. Cryptanalysis ..................................................................................................... 40
3.11. Cryptographic Protocols .................................................................................... 41
4. CELLULAR NETWORK SECURITY ...................................................................... 44
4.1. Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) ........................................... 44
4.1.1. Architecture of GSM .................................................................................... 44
4.1.2. Threats to GSM Networks ............................................................................ 45
4.1.3. Security in GSM ........................................................................................... 47
4.1.4. Cryptographic Algorithm for GSM .............................................................. 50
4.2. General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) ................................................................ 50
4.2.1. Architecture of GPRS ................................................................................... 51
4.2.2. Threats to GPRS ........................................................................................... 52
4.2.3. Security in GPRS .......................................................................................... 54
4.2.4. GPRS Backbone Security ............................................................................. 56
4.2.5. Cryptographic Algorithm for GPRS ............................................................. 57
4.3. Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) ................................... 57
4.3.1. Architecture of UMTS .................................................................................. 57
4.3.2. Threats to UMTS .......................................................................................... 59
4.3.3. Security in UMTS ......................................................................................... 61
4.3.3.1. Security in UTRAN ............................................................................... 62
4.3.3.2. Confidentiality (f8) ................................................................................ 68
4.3.3.3. Integrity (f9) .......................................................................................... 69
4.3.4. Security in Core Network (CN) .................................................................... 70
4.3.4.1. Securityin Network Domain (NDS) ...................................................... 70
4.3.4.2. Securityin Core Network Protocols ....................................................... 70
4.3.4.3. Security in MAP .................................................................................... 71
4.3.4.4. Security in IP-Based Protocol ............................................................... 72
4.3.5. Security in Internetworking between GSM and UMTS ............................... 72
4.3.6. Cryptographic Algorithm for UMTS ............................................................ 74
4.4. Long Term Evolution/System Architecture Evolution (LTE/SAE) .................... 74
4.4.1. Architectureof LTE ...................................................................................... 74
5 
 
4.4.2. Threats toLTE ............................................................................................... 77
4.4.3. Security Requirements for LTE .................................................................... 77
4.4.4. Hierarchical Key Setup ................................................................................. 78
4.4.5. Security in AS and NAS ............................................................................... 79
4.4.6. Security Architecture .................................................................................... 80
4.4.7. Securityin LTE Cellular System ................................................................... 82
4.4.8. Security in Handover Processes ................................................................... 84
4.4.9. Security in Home NodeB (HeNB) ................................................................ 86
4.4.10. Security in Machine Type Communication ( MTC) .................................. 86
4.4.11. Security in IMS ........................................................................................... 87
4.4.12. Cryptographic Algorithms for LTE ............................................................ 88
5. SECURITY MEASUREMENTS FOR SRVCC ........................................................ 89
5.1. Architecture of SRVCC ....................................................................................... 89
5.2. Security in SRVCC .............................................................................................. 91
5.2.1. Security Keys Derivation during SRVCC Procedure ................................... 91
5.3. Case Study & Verification of Test Data Sets ...................................................... 92
5.3.1. Case Study .................................................................................................... 92
5.3.2. Integrity and Confidentiality Algorithms for LTE and UMTS .................. 100
5.3.2.1. Input parameters for Integrity & Confidentiality Algorithms ............. 100
5.3.2.2. Verification of Test Data Sets According to 3GPP Standards ............ 104
5.4. SRVCC Emergency Call ............................................................................... 107
5.4.1. Security in SRVCC Emergency Call .......................................................... 108
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ................................................................. 109
 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting 
AES Advance Encryption Standard 
AH Authentication Header 
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement 
AMF Authentication Management Field  
AMT Analog Modulation Technology 
AMPS Advance Mobile Phone System 
APN Access Point Name 
AS Access Stratum 
ATCF Access Transfer Control Function 
ATGW Access Transfer Gateway 
AuC Authentication Center 
BS Base Station 
BSC Base Station Controller 
BSS Base Station Subsystem 
BTS Base Transceiver Station 
CA Certificate Authority 
CAP CAMEL Application Part 
CBC Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
CC Control Channels 
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access 
CDPD Cellular Digital Packet Data 
7 
 
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode 
C-I-A Confidentiality Integrity and Availability 
CK Cipher Key 
CN Core Network 
CoMP Coordinated Multi Point 
CRL Certificate Revocation List 
CS Circuit Switched 
CSCF Call Service Control Functions 
CSFB Circuit Switched Fallback 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DoS Denial of Service 
DDos Distributed Denial of Service 
DS Data Service 
DTM Data Transfer Mode 
E-CSCF Emergency CSCF 
E-UTRAN Evolved UTRAN 
EAP-AKA Extensible Authentication Protocol-AKA 
EARFCN-DL E-UTRAN’s Absolute Radio Frequency Channel Number-
DownLink 
EATF Emergency Access Transfer Function 
ECB Electronic Codebook Mode 
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
EDGE Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution 
8 
 
EEA  EPS Encryption Algorithm 
 
EIA EPS Integrity Algorithm 
EIR Equipment Identity Register 
EIR Equipment Identity Register 
eNB/eNodeB Evolved Base Station 
EPC Evolved Packet Core 
EPS Evolved Packet System 
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
FAP Femtocell Access Point 
FIFO First In First Out 
GEA GPRS Encryption Algorithm 
GERAN GSM EDGE Radio Access Network 
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node 
GMSK Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications 
GSMA GSM Association 
GTP GPRS Tunneling Protocol  
HE Home Environment 
HeNB/HeNodeB Home eNB 
HLR Home Location Register 
HMAC Hashing for Message Authentication Code 
9 
 
HSCSD High-Speed Circuit-Switch Data 
HSS Home Subscriber Server 
I-CSCF Interrogating CSCF 
IAA Identify Authenticate Authorize 
IK Integrety Key 
IKE Internet Key Exchange 
IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity 
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem 
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity Module 
IMT-MC International Mobile Telecommunications Multi-Carrier 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPSec Internet Protocol Security 
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
ISIM IMS Subscriber Identity Module 
ISMI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
ISUP ISDN User Part  
IWF Inter Working Function 
KAC Key Administration Center 
KDF Key Derivation Function 
KSI Key Set Identifier 
LSB Least Significant Bits 
LTE Long Term Evolution 
M2M Machine to Machine 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
10 
 
MAP Mobile Application Part 
MAPsec MAP Security 
ME Mobile Equipment 
MGCF Media Gateway Control Function  
MGW Media Gateway 
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output 
MME Mobility Management Entity 
MMS Multimedia Message Service 
MoTTPS Management of Trusted Third Party Services. 
MS Mobile Station 
MSC Mobile Services Switching Center 
MTC Machine Type Communication 
NAS Non Access Stratum 
NAT Network Address Translation 
NCC Next hop ChainingCounter 
NDS Network Domain Security 
NGMN Next Generation Mobile Network 
NH Next Hop 
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology (US) 
NMT Nordic Mobile Telephone 
NSS Network Sub System 
OFB Output Feedback Mode 
P-CSCF Proxies CSCF 
PCI Physical Cell Identity 
11 
 
PCRF Policy Control and Charging Rules Function 
PDN Packet Data Network 
PGP Pretty Good Privacy 
P-GW Packet Data Network Gateway 
P-TMSI Packet Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
PRF Pseudo Random Function 
PS Packet Switched 
PSHO Packet Switched HandOver 
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network 
QCI Quality of Service Class Indicator 
QoS Quality of Service 
RA Reasonable Assurance 
RA Registration Authority 
RAN Radio Access Network 
RF Radio Frequencies 
RAT Radio Access Technology 
RC Radio Channels 
RNC Radio Network Controller 
RNS Radio Network Subsystem 
RRC Radio Resource Control 
S-CSCF Serving CSCF 
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 
12 
 
SAGE Security Algorithms Group of Experts 
SA Security Association 
SAE System Architecture Evolution 
SCC AS Services Centralization and Continuity Application Server 
SEG Security Gateway 
SIP Session Initiation Protocol 
SGSN GPRS Support Node 
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node 
S-GW Serving Gateway 
SIM Subscriber Identity Module 
SMS Short Messaging Service 
SN Serving Network 
SPIT Spam over Internet Telephony 
STN-SR Session Transfer Number for SRVCC 
VoLGA Voice over LTE via GAN 
VoLTE  Voice Over LTE 
SRVCC Single Radio Voice Call Continuity 
SSH Secure Shell 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
SVLTE Simultaneous Voice and LTE 
TCH Traffic Channel 
TLLI Temporary Logical Link Identifier 
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Itedentifier 
UE User Equipment 
13 
 
UEA  UMTS Encryption Algorithm 
 
UIA  UMTS Integrity Algorithm 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
UTRA Universal Terrestrial Radio Access 
UTRAN UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network 
VLR Visitor Location Register 
VoLTE Voice Over LTE 
VPLMN Visited Public Land Mobile Network 
vSRVCC Single Radio Video Call Continuity  
WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access 
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity  (IEEE 802.11b wireless network) 
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (IEEE 
802.16 wireless broadband standard) 
WWWW Wireless World Wide Web 
  
14 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Technology 
Author:    Nazia Jamil                                                             
Topic of the Thesis:  Security Measurement for LTE/SAE During 
Single Radio Voice Call Continuity (SRVCC). 
Supervisor:                         Professor Mohammed Salem Elmusrati 
Instructor:    Tobias Glocker 
Degree:    Master of Science in Technology 
Department:   Department of Computer Science 
Degree Programme:  Degree Programme in Information Technology 
Major of Subject:  Telecommunication Engineering  
Year of Entering the University:     2006   
Year of Completing the Thesis:       2014                                                  Pages: 120 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Voice has significant place in mobile communication networks. Though data 
applications have extensively gained in importance over the years but voice is still a 
major source of revenue for mobile operators. It is obvious that voice will remain an 
important application even in the era of Long Term Evolution (LTE). Basically LTE is 
an all-IP data-only transport technology using packet switching. Therefore, it introduces 
challenges to satisfy quality of service expectations for circuit-switched mobile 
telephony and SMS for LTE capable smartphones, while being served on the LTE 
network. Since 2013, mobile operators have been busy deploying Voice Over LTE 
(VoLTE). They are relying on a VoLTE technology called Single Radio Voice Call 
Continuity (SRVCC) for seamless handover between packet-switch domain to circuit-
switch domain or vice versa. The aim of thesis is to review and identify the security 
measurement during SRVCC and verify test data for ciphering and integrity algorithm. 
KEYWORDS: 3GPP, GSMA, LTE/SAE, UMTS, GSM, E-UTRAN, UTRAN, 
GREAN, CS, PS, Handover, IMS, VoLTE, SRVCC, IRATs, VCC, STN-SR, DTM, 
PSHO, Kasumi, Snow 3G, ZUC, AES, lu, Integrity and Ciphering algorithms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s cellular phones and by extension cellular networks have become an important 
part of everyday life. They are used for both personal and business dealings and over the 
years they have developed into all in one device that are used for everything from basic 
voice communication to video sharing and surfing the web. Consequently the 
communication technologies behind these cellular networks have also evolved to handle 
the extended range of data types and requirement for additional bandwidth. As people 
have begun to use their mobile phones for more personal aspects of their lives, the need 
has also increased to make the service secure and reliable. 
Mobile networks are more and more used to transmit also mission critical data in 
everyday business life. The operation scenarios are varied. It starts from simple reading 
of e-mail communication or synchronization of contacts and appointments while 
external working and ends with direct access to business intern applications for 
controlling production processes.  
Nevertheless data transmission via mobile networks is often integrated in business 
processes,without knowing the therewith associated applied threats. Consequently, 
suitable measures that make data transmission secure are not applied at all or not in an 
appropriate way.  
The best way to appreciate security is by looking at vulnerabilities, risks, threats and 
attack to a mobile communications system. At any given moment, anybody could 
eavesdrop into your conversation.  Your bank account information, daily schedule, and 
any other information you may disclose on the phone would be at risk.   
Objective to do this thesis is to take a look at security measurements in cellular 
especially mobile network in general and in SRVCC procedure particularly along with 
test data sets verification against UIA, UEA, EIA and EIA algorithms for UMTS and 
LTE network. 
The thesis consists of five chapters. In the second chapter, introduction of network is 
presented, to give a brief idea of architecture, operation and evolution of cellular 
network. And in the third chapter concrete idea of information and communication 
 security and security related algorithms, functions, attacks
presented. Forth chapter is abou
including GSM, GPRS, UMTS and LTE. This chapter helps to identify possible 
vulnerabilities, risks, threats, attacks, security architecture, security mechanism and 
cryptographic algorithms for a cellular n
(see 
continuity
keys derivation during SRVCC trigger
during the E
of test data sets for integrity and ciphering provided by 3GPP, ETSI/SAGE and GSMA 
are presented in this chapter. Last chapter comprise
proposals.
 
Figure
Figure 1). Fifth chapter is about to identify the security measurement of 
 (VCC) during 
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2. CELLULAR COMMUNICATION 
Cellular communication has become a significant part of our daily life. We can’t 
imagine our life without cellular communication including voice communication, video 
conversation, monetary transactions, and text messaging etc. Cellular mobile 
communication system has been categorized into five generations. So for better 
understanding here is brief background of cellular technology and generations of mobile 
networks. 
2.1. Cellular Technology 
Cellular network is network made up of a number of cells, uses a complex two-way 
radio system between the mobile unit and the wireless network.  It uses radio 
frequencies also known as radio channels over and over again through a market with 
minimal interference, to serve a large number of simultaneous conversation.  This idea 
is the central principle to cellular design and known as frequency reuse. 
Cell: Geographical areas covered by cellular radio antennas are called cells. A cell 
corresponds to the covering area of one transmitter or a small collection of transmitters. 
The size of a cell is determined by the transmitter's power. The main idea of cellular 
systems is the use of low power transmitters to achieve the efficient reuse of the 
frequencies. A cell site lies at the edges of the several cells; middle circle in the Figure 
2 shows the cell site. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cell Site (Nilanka 2011). 
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Cluster: Cluster is a group of cells and very important part of cellular network (see 
Figure 3). The cluster can be repeated continuously within the covering area of an 
operator. Generally a cluster contains 4, 7, 12 or 21 cells and the number of cells in each 
cluster is very important. The number of cells per cluster is inversely proportional to the 
number of channels per cell. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cluster (Nilanka 2011). 
 
Type of Cells: Different types of cells are used according to varied density of 
population in a country. Large cells for remote and sparsely populated areas are covered 
by macrocells. Densely populated areas are covered by micro cells. Selective cells are 
used when cell with a particular shape and coverage are needed. A good example of 
selective cells is the cells that may be located at the entrances of tunnels where, 
coverage of 360 degrees is not required. In this case, a selective cell with coverage of 
120 degrees is used. And umbrella cells cover few microcells; for instance when the 
speed of the mobile is too high, the mobile is handed off to the umbrella cell, and the 
mobile will then stay longer in this cell. (Pagtzis 1999.) 
2.2. Channel 
Mobile phones and transmitter communicate with each other via dedicated paired 
frequencies called channels. Control channel and traffic channel are two main channels. 
Control channels establish connection between mobile unit and nearest base station and 
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take care of setting up and maintain calls. And traffic channels carry voice or data 
connection between users. 
2.3. Operation of Cellular System 
 
This section will give the brief introduction of important component of cellular system: 
The Base Station (BS) is the interface between wireless phones and traditional wired 
phones. It’s what allows you to use your cell phone to call your home phone. It is 
located at centre of each cell and it comprises of antenna, controller and transceivers. 
Base Transceiver Station (BTS) is the radio transmission part of the base station system. 
Base Station Controller (BSC) is the control part of BSC performs the switching 
function in BSC. 
Mobile Services Switching Center (MSC) connects calls between mobile units and from 
mobile to fixed telecommunications network, assigns voice channel, performs handoffs 
and monitors calls (for billing). It obtains all the data for processing subscriber call 
requests from 3 types of databases (HLR, VLR and AUC). Visitor Location Register 
(VLR) stores all related information of mobile subscribers those who enter into its 
coverage area. Home Location Register (HLR) stores the related data of all existing 
mobile subscribers controlled by the same HLR and one HLR can control several 
mobile switching areas. 
2.4. Generation of Cellular Network 
Cellular networks have been around since 1980s and it is getting more and more 
subscriber over the time period. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of cellular network 
generation by generation along with modulation techniques. 
1G (1980s) 
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First generation networks were able to transmit voice at the speed of 9.6 kbps. Advance 
Mobile Phone System (AMPS) and Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) were the known 
cellular networks in USA and Europe respectively and were using Analog Modulation 
Technology (AMT) for data transmission. There was no cryptography implemented and 
sound quality was also very poor. Besides, use of the spectrum was inefficient because 
of analog technology. (Gardezi 2006; Nilanka 2011.) 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of Cellular Networks. 
 
2G & 2.5G (1990s) 
Second generation networks are far much better then 1G but they were also only using 
voice communication and known as Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM). GSM is the most widely adopted technology by all over the world and it uses 
Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK) modulation. 2.5G is a transition step between 
2G and 3G and is also known as data services over 2G. 
Some famous data services which are part of the 2.5G extensions are following: 
Short Messaging Services (SMS) transfer short messages between cell phones, but if 
message is large then it chops the message into several short messages and then send 
multiple messages. 
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High-Speed Circuit-Switch Data (HSCSD) was the first technique to provide data at 
high speed over GSM with 115 kbps speed, but it does not support large bursts of data. 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is more popular technique and of course supports 
large bursts of data transfer. The prominent features of this technique are Service GPRS 
Support Node (SGSN) for security, mobility and control mechanisms, and Gateway 
GPRS Support Node (GGSN) for connectivity to external packet switch network. 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE): This uses 8-PSK modulation. It 
provides up to 348 kbps speed in combination of GPRS. 
Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD): This is packet base data service and able to 
identify idle voice channels, and utilizes those idle channels for transferring data traffic 
without interrupting voice communication. 
CDMA-1 is also known as IS-95a and was initial 2G technique used by USA. It allows 
using the entire spectrum by user and supports more users than TDMA and GSM. 
CDMA-2 provides 115.2 kbps speed. (Gardezi 2006; Nilanka 2011.) 
 
3G (2000s) 
Third generation is known as Universal Mobile telecommunication Systems (UMTS) in 
Europe and as a CDMA 2000 in U.S.A.  It is based on Universal Terrestrial Radio 
Access (UTRA) radio interface and extended GSM/GPRS network. 3G is a family of 
standards which can all work together and WCDMA is the air-interface for the UMTS. 
The second Interface IMT Multicarrier (IMT-MC) is backward compatible with IS-95, 
and provides seamless transitions to 3G. It comprises of BS (Base Station) or node B, 
RNC (Radio Network Controller), along with Wideband CDMA Mobile Switching 
Centre (WMSC) and SGSN/GGSN. UMTS is broadband and offers packet-based 
transmission of text, digitized voice, video, and multimedia up to or higher than 2 mbps. 
The first commercial 3G network was launched by NTT Do Co Mo in Japan branded 
FOMA, based on W-CDMA technology in 2001. 
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4G (2012) 
The fourth generation is 3GPP’s Long Term Evolution(LTE). Enhanced Multiple-Input 
Multiple-Output (MIMO) channel transmission techniques and extensive coordination 
among multiple cell sites called Coordinated Multipoint (CoMP) transmission/reception 
are key techniques for LTE. 4G offers high-quality service and fast data transfer rates.  
It needs a data speed transfer rate of 100 mbps while a user moves at high speed, and a 
1Gbps data rate in a fixed position.  It also needs to share the network resources to 
support more simultaneous connections on the cell.  Phones on a 4G network also need 
to use Internet Protocol (IP) technology for data transfers through packets. 
 
5G (2020) 
5G is still in theory currently and has not been implemented yet. However, 5G is 
complete wireless communication with almost no limitations, thus, can be called REAL 
wireless world, when implemented it would have incredible transmission speed, and 
would be capable of supporting wireless world wide web (WWWW). It would reach 
25Mbps connectivity speed, while uploading and downloading speed up to 1Gbps. 
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3. BASIC SECURITY CONCEPTS 
Basic concept of security, introduction of information and communication security, and 
cryptography is being discussed in this chapter. This chapter will give the road map of 
security and its related algorithms, functions, attacks, risks, and protocols. 
3.1. Security 
Basic definition of the security is “freedom from fear, anxiety, danger or doubt and 
having a state of safety or certainty”. But it is bit relative measure and we can say that 
no system is absolutely secure system we only can try to take all possible measures to 
protect a system. Security systems only offer a set of steps for protection (safety) over 
targeted resources (assets) against the mentioned or identified dangers (threat). 
Security can be grouped as security mechanism, security service and security attack. 
Where security mechanism is designed to detect, prevent or recover a system from 
attack(s) is known as security mechanism. Security serviceenhances the security of the 
data processing and the information transfers of an organization. “The services are 
intended to counter security attacks, and they make use of one or more security 
mechanisms to provide the service” (Stallings 2010). And security attack is defined as 
“any action that compromises the security of information owned by an organization” 
(Stallings 2010). 
3.2. Information Security 
Information security is to protect the information system and data from unauthorized 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, tampering or destruction. 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are there objectives of information security. 
Confidentiality means “information that should stay secrete stays secrete and only 
authorized person may access it” (Fundamental Security Concept 2013). Cryptography 
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and access control are main mechanism of protection confidentiality in the information 
systems. And malware, intruders, social engineering, insecure networks, and poorly 
administrated systems are examples of threats to confidentiality. 
Integrity deals with the trustworthiness, origin, completeness, and correctness of 
information. It prevents information from unauthorized or improper modifications. It 
not only deals with integrity of information itself but also with the integrity of origin. 
Integrity protection mechanism may be grouped in two broad categories: preventive 
mechanisms and detective mechanisms. Preventive mechanism is such as access 
controls that prevent unauthorized modification of information. Detective mechanisms 
detect unauthorized modifications when preventive mechanisms became failure. 
Availability is as important and necessary as confidentiality and integrity are. It tells 
that, who needs confidentiality and integrity if the authorized users cannot access and 
use the information? Who needs sophisticated encryption and access controls if the 
protected information is not accessible for authorized users and when they need it? 
Denial of service (DoS) attacks belongs to this category. 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C-I-A) triad have some of the main controls 
aimed at protecting such as identification, authentication, and authorization process and 
methods. 
Identification is the very first step of identify-authenticate-authorize sequence that is 
performed everyday by humans and computers when access to information or 
information processing resources is required. While particulars of identification system 
differ depending upon who or what is being identified, some intrinsic properties of 
identification apply regardless of these particulars. These three are intrinsic properties 
are scope, locality, and uniqueness of IDs. 
“For information security, unique names are required and, depending on their scope, 
they must be locally unique and possibly globally unique so that access control may be 
enforced and accountability established” (Fundamental Security Concept 2013). 
Authentication is a verification of the identity declared at the stage of identification. 
What you know, what you have, or what you are; are three methods of authentication. 
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To obtain reasonable assurance for declared identity belong to the party in 
communication is aim of authenticity. It is important to note that reasonable assurance 
may mean different degrees of assurance, depending on the particular environment and 
application, and therefore may require different approaches to authentication” 
(Fundamental Security Concept 2013). 
Authorization is next step to identification and authentication; users are assigned a set of 
authorization (e.g. rights, privileges, or permissions) that defines what they can do on 
the system. These authorizations are usually defined by the system or security 
administrators. 
Accountability “refers to possibility of tracing actions and events back in time to the 
users, systems, or process that performed then, to establish responsibility for action or 
omission” (Fundamental Security Concept 2013). It can be provided by logs and audit 
trials in context of information system. 
Non-repudiation is a way to guarantee that the sender of a message cannot later deny 
having sent the message and that the recipient cannot deny having received the message. 
In international ISO 14516: 2002 (guidelines for usage and management of trusted third 
party services): approval, sending, origin, submission, transport, receipt, knowledge and 
delivery aretypes of non-repudiation services. 
3.3. Design Principles of Security 
Different principles ofsecurity design can be seen in Table 1. Followings are steps/ 
principles to design a secure information or communication system. 
 
Table 1. Design Principle of Security. 
Threat analysis To list down all possible threats against the system, regardless of 
difficulty and cost measurements. 
Risk analysis To Estimate the probability of various attacks and the potential gain 
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for the attackers and/or damage to the attacked side cause by them. 
Requirements 
capture 
Depending on the earlier phases, it is now decided what kind of 
protection is required for the system. 
Designs Phase 
 
“The actual protection mechanisms are designed in order to meet the 
requirements. Existing building blocks, such as security protocols or 
primitives, are identified. Possibly new mechanisms are created, and 
security architecture is built. This is also possible that not all 
requirements can be met, so we have to take constraints into 
account. This may cause a need to re-visit earlier phases, especially 
risk analysis” (Forsberg, Horn, Moeller & Niemi 2010: 11). 
Security 
Analysis 
It can be done by using automation verification tools and by using 
creative method we can identify holes in the security system. 
Reaction Phase This is not possible to plan everything beforehand, so it is very 
important to design a flexible mechanism. In case of unexpected 
reaction a mechanism should be capable of allowing enhancement. 
It is always useful to have reasonable amount of safety margin in the 
mechanism. “These margins tend to be useful in cases where new 
attack methodologies appear faster than expected. (Forsberg et al. 
2010: 11.) 
3.4. Security Vulnerability, Threat Risk & Attack 
To secure the system we should identify the vulnerabilities, threats and attacks towards 
the system. Vulnerability is any procedural weakness that may allow an attacker to enter 
and exploit the resources with unauthorized access. In simple words it is absence of 
weakness of safeguard. 
Threat is any potential danger towards the system or networks. It is a possibility that 
someone could identify and exploit the vulnerability. The entity that takes the advantage 
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of vulnerability is known as threat agent. And risk is frequency of threat agent taking 
advantage of vulnerability. Risk can be reduced by reducing vulnerability and/or threats. 
3.4.1. Threat and Risk Assessment 
Along with these above mentioned steps, the threat and risk assessment should be taken 
into account. The objective of a threat and risk assessment is to provide services or 
recommendations, for maximizing the protection of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability along with functionality and usability. 
Egners, Rey, Schmidt, Schneider & Wessel (2012: 14) have mentioned, that a threat is 
"a potential cause of an incident that may result in harm to a system or organization" 
and a vulnerability as "a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by 
one or more threats". While according to them a threat can be categorized with respect 
to availability, confidentiality and integrity and those could be loss of availability, 
confidentiality, integrity and control. In mobile network the most significant threat is 
theft of service which is in result of integrity or confidentiality breaking. 
Loss of availability is comprises of flooding an interface and crashing a network 
through protocols or flaw of application implementation. Loss of confidentiality is 
comprises of eavesdropping and unauthorized access to sensitive data on a network 
element through leakage. Loss of integrity is composition of traffic modification and 
data insertion. Loss of control is compromise or/and abuse of network elements. It could 
be happened by protocols/applications implementation vulnerability, by management 
interface or by insider malicious. And theft of service is defined as: attacker exploits a 
flaw such as the authentication and authorization mechanisms to use services without 
being charged. (Egners et al. 2012: 20-22.) 
“The potential or possibility of compromise, loss, injury or other adverse consequence” 
is called Risk. It can be formulized in the simplest way as following: 
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(Langham 2013.) 
 
From equation (1) it can be seen that Risk is overlapping of threat and vulnerability. We 
are at a risk when our systems have a vulnerability which allows the threat to attack. 
Risk management is the process of identifying, analyzing, evaluating and reducing the 
risks of a system and it is to weigh and make decisions about acceptable risk. 
3.4.2. Attack 
Basic definition of attack can be: “any action that compromises the security of 
information”. In other words an attack can be defined as “any malicious or accident 
disruption in the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information or network 
resources” (UNT 2003). Attacks can be grouped in four basic categories: access, 
modification, denial of service and repudiation and those can come from many places, 
electronics, physical or human. Table 2 shows the matrix of attacks where: access 
attacks are possible for confidentiality and accountability, modification attack is 
possible at integrity and accountability, DoS attack is possible at only availability and 
repudiation attack is same as modification. 
 
 
Table 2. Information Security Matrix (UNT 2003). 
 Security Objectives 
Attack Types Confidentiality Integrity Availability Accountability 
Access X   X 
Modification  X  X 
DoS   X  
Repudiation  X  X 
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3.5. Basic Concept of Cryptography 
Cryptology is an ancient art and science of secrete (crypto) writing (graphy).  Secrete 
writing including the principles and methods of transforming an intelligible message 
into unintelligible, and then retransforming that message back to its original form. It is 
tremendous tool to provide the basis of many security mechanisms, but it is not the 
solution of all security problems and not reliable unless implemented and used properly. 
Security objectives such as authentication, privacy/confidentiality, Integrity, Non-
repudiation can be obtained by applying cryptology techniques. Cryptology comprises 
of crypto-graphy which is practice of using cryptosystems to maintain the 
confidentiality or designing system by using cryptologic techniques and crypto-analysis 
which is a study of breaking cryptosystem or try to identify weakness in cryptosystems 
and it contributes indirectly to achieve a better security level. Key words for 
cryptography are defined in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Key Words for Cryptography. 
Plaintext (P) The original intelligible or readable message or data that is 
fed into the cipher algorithm as an input. 
Cipher An algorithm, used for transforming the intelligible message 
into one that is unintelligible by transposition and/or 
substitution method. 
Key (K) Critical information used by the cipher, known only to the 
sender and receiver. 
Ciphertext (C) Transformed or scrambled unintelligible message produced 
as an output of encryption. It depends on the plaintext and 
the secret key. For a given message, two different keys will 
produce two different ciphertexts. 
Encipher (E) The process of converting plaintext into ciphertext by using 
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cipher and key. 
Decipher (D) Reverse process of encoding, here ciphertext is converted 
back to plaintext by using cipher and key. 
Encryption algorithm A mathematical function 
   	!" #$                                                 (2) 
Where C is ciphertext, E is encipher, P is plain text and Ke is 
encryption key. (Yang 2008.) 
Decryption algorithm Reverse mathematical function with the matching key. 
!	  	%		" #&                                                  (3) 
Where P is plaintext, D is decipher, C is ciphertext and Kd is 
encryption key*. (Yang 2008.) 
Cryptanalysis 
(attacker, intruder) 
The study of principle and methods of transforming an 
unintelligible message back into an intelligible message 
without knowing of the key. 
 
Cryptosystem can be categorized as conventional and modern cryptography. In 
conventional cryptography the encryption algorithms are designed to be rather complex 
and difficult to guess. But in modern technique an encryption algorithms are made 
public but keys are kept secret. The strength of algorithm depends upon how difficult of 
determining Kd. 
Symmetric encryption uses a single secret key between sender and intend receiver. 
 
%		 		'" (" (	 	 	'	     (4) 
 
Where D is deciphering, E is enciphering, p is plaintext and k is key. 
(Forsberg et al. 2010: 14.) 
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Asymmetric encryption  uses two keys one is public key and another is private key. The 
public key is available for everyone, but the private key is only known by the owner. 
When the message is encrypted with the public key, only the corresponding private key 
can decrypt the message. 
 
%		 		'" ()" (*	 	 	'     (5) 
 
Where D is deciphering, E is enciphering, p is plaintext and k1&k2are keys (these are 
not identical, and k2 cannot be easily derived from k1. (Forsberg et al. 2010: 14.) 
3.6. Symmetric or Conventional Cryptography 
Conventional or symmetric encryption methods are divided into two main categories: 
block and stream cipher. 
3.6.1. Stream Cipher 
This algorithm encrypts bits individually and can be achieved by adding a bit from a 
key stream to a plaintext bit. There are synchronous stream ciphers where the key 
stream depends only on the key, and asynchronous where the key stream depends on the 
key and ciphertext both. In Figure 5, the gray thin line shows, the stream cipher is an 
asynchronous one but practical stream ciphers are synchronous. Stream ciphers are 
particularly related to the applications with little computational resources because they 
tend to be small and fast, e.g., for cell phones or other small embedded devices. A very 
significant example for a stream cipher is the A5/1 cipher, which is part of the GSM 
mobile phone standard and is used for voice encryption. And sometimes Stream cipher 
is also used for encrypting Internet traffic, especially the RC4. (Paar & Pelzl 2010: 30-
31.) 
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Iterative Cipher: Generally block cipher becomes stronger when it is iterated several 
times. In the design of block cipher, iteration is used inside the block cipher. These 
iterations s are called rounds. An iterative cipher starts with simple but useful function 
and iterates for many rounds until it is secured. Security can be increased by adding the 
rounds but it will also cause to increase the processing time. 
Confusion and Diffusion: Shannon in 1948 introduced two concepts as basic building 
blocks for designing cryptographic systems confusion which is the “relationship 
between plaintext bit and ciphertext bit (should be as complex and involved as 
possible)” (Forsberg et al. 2010: 17). And diffusion means each plaintext bit and each 
encryption key bit should affect each ciphertext bit. 
Modes of Operation 
Block cipher encrypt fixed-sized block e.g. DES encrypts 64-bits blocks, but what 
happens when plaintext is longer than the size of a cipher block or plaintext is not a 
multiple of cipher block size? to take care of these problems, NIST has defined several 
methods called “modes of operation”. There are five modes of operation: 
 
Electronic Code Book (ECB): In this mode, each plaintext block is encrypted 
independently without any input from other block. From equation (7) and the Figure 7, 
“each ciphertext block is obtained by applying the DES encryption process to the 
current plaintext block directly. So the current ciphertext block has no dependency on 
any previous plaintext blocks” (Yang 2014). 
-	  	% .		#" !-     (7) 
 
Where C is ciphertext, DES is Data Encryption Standard algorithm, K is key, P is 
plaintext and iisa counter. (Yang 2008.) 
Encryption and decryption could be parallel done could be advantage of this mode. 
34 
 
Two blocks of with identical plaintext produces identical ciphertext and bit error in one 
block affects the whole block and plaintext patterns are still visible after encryption 
done can be considered as disadvantage of this mode. (Syben 2011.) 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC): From equation (8), each block of plaintext is XORed 
with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted to generate the current 
ciphertext block. And also note that for the first block, the Initial Vector (IV) is used as 
the previous ciphertext block. 
 
-	  	% .	#" !-	/	- 0 ); 	1	  	23    (8) 
Where C, DES, P is same as in equation (7). While C0 is initial value and IV is initial 
vector. (Yang 2008.) 
Decryption could be parallel done and plaintext patterns are blurred are advantages of 
this mode. Encryption has to be done sequentially and bit error in one block affects two 
blocks are disadvantages of this mode. (Syben 2011.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Electronic Code Book (ECB) Mode (Yang 2008). 
 
Output feedback (OFB): In this mode, each plaintext block is XORed with the current 
output block to be the ciphertext block. The current output block is the encrypted 
version of the previous output block. Key stream can be pre-computed, no padding is 
required and bit error only affect one bit are advantages of this mode. Key-stream 
computation cannot be done in parallel, reusing of key an initialization vector is at risk 
and bit-flipping attacks are convenient are disadvantages of this mode. (Syben 2011.) 
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Cipher feedback mode (CFB): In this mode, each plaintext block is XORed with the 
encrypted version of the ciphertext of the previous block to be the ciphertext block. 
Decryption could be done in parallel and plaintext patterns are blurred are advantages of 
this mode. No padding is required, bit error only affects one bit, and decryption can be 
parallelized are disadvantages of this mode. (Syben 2011.) 
 
Counter mode (CTR): This mode uses cipher block as pseudorandom bit generator and 
encrypts a known string of numbers in ECB mode, producing a string of output blocks 
DES (K, Ii) (see equation (9)). 
 
-	  	!-	/	% .		#" 2-     (9) 
 
Where I is random bit and iis a counter. (Yang 2008.) 
Encryption/decryption of each block could be parallelized, no padding is required, and 
keystream can be pre-computed and can be done in parallel are advantages of this mode. 
Bit-flipping attacks are convenient, reusing of key and nonce/counter is at risk are 
disadvantages of this mode. (Syben 2011.) 
3.6.3. Comparison of Symmetric Encryption Algorithms 
Table 4 is showing the comparison of different symmetric encryption algorithm with 
key lengths vs strength. 
 
Table 4. Symmetric Encryption Algorithm (Yang 2008). 
Algorithm Strength Key Length 
3DES Strong 64, 112, 128 
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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Strong 128, 192, 256 
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) Strong 64,128 
Blowfish Weak 32, 448 
RC4 Weak  
RC5 Strong 32, 64, 128 
3.6.4. Problems with Symmetric Encryption 
“A single key must be shared in pairs of each sender and receiver. In a distributed 
environment with large numbers of combination pairs involved in many-to-one 
communication topology, it is difficult for the one recipient to keep so many keys in 
order to support all communication” (Yang 2008).  
Key management: setting up and acquisition of the secret key. The integrity of data 
could be compromised when the receiver cannot get assurance that the message has not 
been modified before receipt. “It is possible for the sender to repudiate the message 
because there are no mechanisms for the receiver to make sure that the message has 
been sent by the claimed sender” (Yang 2008).  
3.7. Modern or Asymmetric Cryptography 
Asymmetric cryptography is also known as public-key cryptography. It was invented in 
1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman for this reason; sometime it is called 
Diffie-Hellman encryption. It relies on the existence of a computational primitive called 
trapdoor or one-way function. Such a function is easy to perform in one direction, but 
difficult or impossible to reverse. From Figure 8, we can see that sender takes 
receiver’s public key and uses it to encrypt the plaintext. Only Receiver can then 
decrypt the encoded text, because he is the only one who knows the corresponding 
private key. Asymmetric ciphers are quite slow then the symmetric ones, which is why 
asymmetric ciphers are used only to securely distribute the key. 
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Few famous asymmetric encryption algorithms are RSA, Digital Signature Algorithm 
(DSA), Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, ElGamal, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), 
and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).  
This cryptography is very useful with many-to-many relationship because of easier key 
management for large systems. The possibility to use digital signatures leads to the 
possibility for non-repudiation. And also it is useful to solve the scalability problem, 
because everyone will need only one public key and one private key to communicate 
with other people. 
It has disadvantages such as it is slower than secret key cryptography (or symmetric 
cryptography) methods, due to high computational requirements. It uses a fixed buffer 
size, depending on particular and small data amounts, which may only be encrypted and 
not chained in streams. And it is more robust and less liable to third party security 
breach attempts because a broad range of possible encryption keys are used. 
3.7.1. Digital Signature 
 
The most significant benefit of public key cryptography is that, it provides a method for 
implementing digital signatures. “Digital signatures enable the recipient of information 
to verify the authenticity of the information’s origin and also verify that the information 
is intact. Thus, public key digital signatures provide authentication and data integrity. A 
digital signature also provides non-repudiation” (Zimmermann 2000: 19-20). 
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Figure 8. Asymmetric or Public-key Cryptography. 
 
3.7.2. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
A PKI is a combination of software and procedures providing a means for managing 
keys and certificates, it allows internet or other public network’s users to have a secure 
communication, data exchange and money transaction. PKI is done by public and 
private key algorithm in which key pairs are provided by a Certificate Authority (CA). 
The private key is given to the person who requests for it and the public key is made 
public in a directory for users. No one can ever find out what someone’s private key is 
and it is never published on the internet. The private key is used for proving user 
identity and encrypting the digital certificate. The digital certificate is decrypted by the 
public key, which is used by the message receiver. 
The registration process for a digital certificate begins with a Registration Authority 
(RA). This registration must take place before the CA knows whether or not the user 
will be issued a certificate. RA verifies the user’s identity and issue certificate to the 
right user. If a user’s private key gets compromised (e.g. stolen) the certificate must be 
revoked from Certificate Revocation List (CRL). (Zimmermann 2000: 24.) 
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3.8. Hybrid Cryptosystem 
A hybrid encryption scheme uses public-key encryption to encrypt a random symmetric 
key, and then proceeds to encrypt the message with that symmetric key. The receiver 
decrypts the symmetric key using the public-key encryption scheme and then uses the 
recovered symmetric key to decrypt the message. (Katz 2004.) 
3.9. Hash Functions 
A hash function H is a transformation that takes a variable-size input x and returns a 
fixed-size string, which is called the hash value h (i.e. h = H(x)). The basic requirements 
for a cryptographic hash function are: the input can be of any length, the output has a 
fixed length, H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x, H(x) is one-way and 
H(x) is collision-free. Main role of a cryptographic hash function is to verify the digital 
signatures because these functions are faster than DSA. 
3.9.1. One-Way Hash Function 
A hash function H is said to be one-way if it is hard to invert, where "hard to invert" 
means that given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find some input x 
such that H(x) = h. One-way hash functions are also called message digest algorithms 
and  it does not require any key. For some purpose they fulfill these conditions: 
If it is computationally infeasible to find a message y at given x, not equal to x such that 
 H(x) = H(y) then H is weakly collision-free hash function or 2nd-preimage resistance.  
If it is computationally infeasible to find any two messages x and y such that H(x) = 
H(y) then H is a strongly collision-free hash function or collision resistance.  
Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-1 (160-bit) for the Internet X.509 PKI, SHA-256 (256-bit) 
and Message-Digest MD2 (128-bit) for certificates, MD4 (128-bit) and MD5 (128-bit) 
is for other legacy applications are famous examples of keyless hash of function. (Katz 
2004.) 
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3.9.2. Keyed Hash Function 
To design the computation of hash function around a secret key is also possible. Keyed 
hash function has shorter output then keyless hash function; Message Authentication 
Codes (MACs) is an example for this category. There are three different strategies for 
designing of a message authentication code: either direct design, or use of cipher block 
or keyless hash functions as building blocks. The HMAC construction is an example of 
third strategy. If we assume that k is the key and x is our input, then the value for MAC 
is obtained by double hashing: 
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Where HMAC is keyed hash function, h is hash function, x is variable size input and 
opad & ipad are just constant values. 
The basic use of MAC is to ensure the integrity of a message. 
(Katz 2004; Zimmermann 2000: 20-21.) 
3.10. Cryptanalysis 
Cryptanalysis is the art of deciphering encrypted communications without knowing the 
proper keys. Attackers can be categorized into Active and Passive categories in the 
cryptosystem (Forsberg et al. 2010: 19). Active attacker adds, deletes and modifies 
message, and tries to break other security features along with the confidentiality. While 
passive attacker only monitors the communication and tries to break confidentiality. 
Some of the more important ones for a system implementer are described below. 
Ciphertext-only attack is when the attacker has no knowledge of contents of the 
message, and must work from ciphertext only. Modern cryptosystem is not weak 
against ciphertext-only attacks. 
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Known-plaintext attack is when the attacker knows or can guess the plaintext for some 
parts of the ciphertext. The famous modern known-plaintext attack is linear 
cryptanalysis against block ciphers. 
Chosen-plaintext attack is when the attacker is able to know any text he likes encrypted 
with the unknown key. Differential cryptanalysis against block ciphers or hash 
functions is a good example of this attack. RSA is also vulnerable to chosen-plaintext 
attacks. 
Man-in-the-middle attack is relevant for cryptographic communication and key 
exchange protocols, when A and B are exchanging keys for secure communication then 
an adversary positions himself between A and B on the communication line and 
intercepts the signals. To prevent this attack we can use digital signature. 
Correlation between the secret key and the output of the cryptosystem is the main 
source of information to the cryptanalyst. In the easiest case, the information about the 
secret key is directly leaked by the cryptosystem. The correlation idea is essential to 
cryptography, which provably secures against such attacks. 
Attack against or using the underlying hardware is related to hardware implementation 
of the cryptosystem, attacker tries to obtain the secret key or other kinds information 
stored on the device. 
3.11. Cryptographic Protocols 
Cryptographic protocol is a protocol executed on a network where the messages or part 
of the messages are produced using cryptographic functions. Cryptographic protocols 
are used to exchange secret information, to achieve a transaction (Electronic 
Commerce), to vote, to protect copyright on digital content etc. Some famous protocols 
are mentioned below: 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec): provides a stable and durable base for securing 
network layer. It supports all of the cryptographic algorithms in use today, and can also 
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accommodate newer, more powerful algorithms as they become available. It has 
capability to address below mentioned major security issues:  
Data origin authentication-verifies that each data was originated by the 
claimed sender. 
Data integrity- verifies that the contents of a data were not modified in 
transit, either deliberately or due to some errors. 
Data confidentiality – keeps secret the content of a message, by using 
encryption. 
Replay protection - ensures that an attacker cannot intercept a data and 
play it back at some later time. 
Automated management of cryptographic keys and security associations - 
ensures that your VPN policy can be used throughout the extended 
network with little or no manual configuration. “VPN uses two IPSec 
protocols to protect data when data passes through this tunnel: 
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). 
The other part of IPSec is to enable Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol, 
or key management. While IPSec encrypts data, IKE supports automated 
negotiation of Security Associations (SAs), and automated generation and 
refreshing of cryptographic keys” (IBM 2014).  
 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/TLS: SSL/TLS works over Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) and tunnels other protocols using TCP. SSL protocol, establishes secure 
connections between clients and server applications by authenticating one or both 
endpoints of the communication session. It also provides privacy and integrity of the 
data between client and server applications. 
TLS provides the key-hashing for message authentication (HMAC) and enhanced 
Pseudo Random Function (PRF) security improvement. TLSuses Key-Hashing for 
Message Authentication Code (HMAC), which ensures that a record cannot be altered 
while travelling over an open network. SSL Version 3.0 also provides keyed message 
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authentication, but HMAC is more secure than the MAC function which is used by SSL 
Version 3.0.  And PRF generates key data and is defined by HMAC in TLS. The PRF 
uses two hash algorithms to assure its security. If either algorithm is exposed, the data 
will remain secure until second algorithm is not exposed.  
(IBM 2014.) 
 
OpenPGP and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME): are standards 
used public key cryptography to encrypt email. The OpenPGP standard was originally 
derived from PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), first created by Phil Zimmermann in 1991. 
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions is a standard for signing of MIME data. 
It was originally developed by RSA Data Security Inc. 
 
The Secure Shell (SSH): is a protocol for secure network communications, and 
relatively simple and inexpensive to implement. The initial version, SSH1, focused on 
providing a secure remote logon facility to replace Telnet and other remote logon 
schemes that provided no security. SSH also provides a more general client-server 
capability and can be used to secure network functions such as file transfer and e-mail. 
SSH2 is a new version and improved version of SSH1. 
 
Kerberos: is for single sign-on and authenticating users against a central authentication 
and key distribution server. It works by giving authenticated users "tickets", granting 
them access to various services on the network. When clients then contact servers, the 
servers can verify the tickets.  
Kerberos is a primary method for securing and supporting authentication on a LAN, and 
for establishing shared secrets (it needs to be used with other algorithms for the actual 
protection of communication).  
(Wheeler 2004.) 
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4. CELLULAR NETWORK SECURITY 
According to Douligeris and Kotzanikolaou (2006), the goal of communication security 
is protecting information and user during the transmission via communicating medium 
from unauthorized exposure, modification or interception. In order to achieve the goals 
of network security in any network, the following steps must be taken into account.  
• Scope of the network and assets to be protected, should be defined. 
• Possible attacks and threats should be defined. 
• Desired security level and security risk should be defined and evaluated. 
• Security policies should be defined. 
• Security services and mechanisms must be defined and implemented properly. 
• Proper placement of security polices, services and mechanism should be assured 
periodically. 
4.1. Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
GSM is the most popular mobile phone system in the world and consists of EDGE, 
3GSM, and GPSR. EDGE is an upper level component used for downloading audio and 
video clips, and multimedia messages. GPSR is for web-browsing (“always-on”). 
3GSM is the GSM running on third generation standards for multimedia services” 
(Huynh & Nguyen 2003). 
4.1.1. Architecture of GSM 
Refer to the Figure 9, the entire GSM architecture consists of three basic entities 
Mobile Station (MS), Base Station Subsystem (BSS) and Network Sub System (NSS). 
The MS consists of Mobile Equipment (ME) and Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). 
SIM stores secret information such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity Module 
(IMSI), Secret Key (Ki) for authentication,  Personal Identification Number (PIN) and 
other subscribers’ information. The BSS controls the radio link and provides a radio 
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interface for the rest of the network. The BTS houses the radio transceivers that define a 
cell and handles the radio-link protocols with the MS. BSC controls several base 
stations by managing their radio resources, and it is connected to mobile services 
switching center (MSC). NSS is also known as the Core Network (CN) and consists of 
several databases such as VLR, HLR and Gateway MSC (GMSC). GMSC is interface 
between the GSM network and Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).  The MSC 
provides registration, authentication, location updating, handovers and call routing with 
the coordination of HLR and VLR. The HLR contains administrative information of 
registered subscribers in the network with its current location. While the VLR contains 
only administrative information of subscribers currently located/moved to its area. The 
Equipment Identity Register (EIR) and Authentication Center (AuC) contains list of 
valid Mobile Equipment (ME) and subscribers who are authenticated into network. 
(Elouafiq 2011.)  
 
 
 
Figure 9. GSM Architecture (InfoSec Reading Room  2001). 
4.1.2. Threats to GSM Networks  
In general GSM does not meet high security requirements and most attacks are out 
comes of weak algorithm and architectural flaws. The most important vulnerability of 
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GSM architecture’s security no needs of network authentication by MS because it was 
beyond the imagination in 1990s. An attacker would be able to impersonate a network 
by establishing a faked BTS. GSM cell phone always connects to BTS with the most 
intense signal. So an attacker is able to connect any GSM device with faked BTS simply 
by providing the strongest signals, not only able to connect but also able to configure 
the BTS as an original BTS. That leads a man-in-the-middle attack. The biggest threat is 
to obtain all data sent by MS in the plaintext. Attacker configures BTS by offering A5/0 
(means no encryption). With faked BTS there is possibility of DoS attack as well. 
The Smartcard Developer Association and ISAAC security research group discovered a 
flaw in the COMP 128 algorithm that effectively enabled them to retrieve the secret key 
Ki from a SIM. The attack was performed on a SIM (physical access) but the same 
attack is applicable over-the-air. The attack reveals the information about Ki by 
providing RANDs as a given parameter to algorithm A8.  And the SIM was accessed 
through a smartcard reader connected to a PC. 
The anonymity in GSM is provided by using TMSI, which is like a nickname of 
subscriber locally. An attacker may want some subscriber’s movements and/or follow 
call samples and so must have the IMSI and the TMSI of the MS. This information may 
also be used to attack other security assets than anonymity, such as eavesdropping on a 
specific person. If the attacker can get the IMSI of subscriber or associated current 
TMSI of a specific person then the anonymity of the user is imperiled. Usually 
ciphering algorithm A5/1 and A5/2 are rejected; it means there is no encryption at MS. 
Over-the-air privacy of GSM telephone conversations is protected by using A5 stream 
algorithm. This algorithm has two main variants: A5/1 is the “strong” export-limited 
version used by CEPT-countries, and A5/2 is the “weak” version that has no export 
limitations. The confidentiality of GSM is protected by the session key Kc with 64-bits 
length which shows that complexity of brute force attack is 264. Brute force complexity 
can be reduced up to 254 by setting last 10 bits to zero. 
(Egners et al. 2012: 31-38.) 
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4.1.3. Security in GSM 
To provide an infrastructure with protected access to mobile services and to secure the 
user’s information are prime objective of GSM security. To achieve authentication, 
confidentiality, and integrity in GSM network; authentication of subscribers, secure date 
transfer over the network, protect and secure subscriber’s identity, without SIM a 
mobile phones can use only emergency service and duplicate SIMS on network are not 
allowed at all and the keys are securely stored are points to be considered. 
In GSM network, security is divided into three different levels. On the very first level, 
GSM authenticates the subscriber visa SIM and SIM identifies the subscriber. On the 
second level of security, current location of the subscriber and incoming calling user’s 
identification is revealed. On the third level encryption of data is done between these 
two users. Integrity and confidentiality is obtained by establishing secure connection 
and encrypted the data. (Huynh et al.  2003.) 
Encryption Implementation: Now we can take a look at above mentioned three levels: 
 
Authentication at Mobile Station: The GSM network authenticates the identity of the 
subscriber by utilizing a Challenge/Response mechanism which is described in Figure 
10. Initially MS receives a 128-bit Random Number (RAND). Based upon this 
challenged RAND along with the Authentication Algorithm (A3) and individual 
subscriber authentication key (Ki), the MS computes the 32-bit Signed Response 
(SRES). Figure 11 describes the process of generation of SRES quite clearly. The GSM 
network repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the subscriber after having the 
SRES from the subscriber. The individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) is never 
transmitted over the radio channel. It is present in the subscriber's SIM, as well as the 
AUC, HLR, and VLR databases as previously described. If the received SRES matches 
with the calculated value, the MS has been successfully authenticated and may continue. 
If the values do not match, the connection is terminated and an authentication failure 
indicated to the MS which we can see in Figure 12. In the SIM the calculation of the 
SRES is done and assures enhanced security. The reason is, during the authentication 
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process the confidential subscriber information like the IMSI or the individual 
subscriber Ki is never released from the SIM. (Margrave) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Challenge/Response Mechanism (Stepanov 2003). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Generation of Signed Response (SRES) (Stepanov 2003). 
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Figure 12. Authentication in the GSM (Margrave). 
 
Signalling and Data Confidentiality: The SIM contains the ciphering key generating 
algorithm (A8), which is used to produce the 64-bit Ciphering Key (Kc). The Kc is 
computation is shown in Figure 13; here RAND is same as in authentication process 
and Ki is an authentication key of individual subscriber. Later on it will be show that the 
ciphering key (Kc) is used to encrypt and decrypt the data between the MS and BS. 
To avoid the eavesdropping and to make the system more resistant, an additional level 
of security is introduced by changing the ciphering key. The ciphering key may be 
changed at certain frequency as per requirement of network design and security 
measurements. By implementing the ciphering algorithm A5, encrypted voice and data 
communications are accomplished between the MS and the network. Encrypted 
communication is initiated by a ciphering mode request command from the GSM 
network. On the base of this command, the mobile station starts encryption and 
decryption of data using the ciphering algorithm (A5) and the ciphering key (Kc). 
Subscriber Identity Confidentiality: The Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) 
is key element to ensure the identity confidentiality of subscriber. After the completion 
of authentication and encryption procedure, the TMSI is sent to the mobile station. The 
mobile station responds by the acknowledgement of the TMSI. The TMSI is valid in the 
location area, where it was issued. The Location Area Identification (LAI) is required 
along with the TMSI if need to communicate outside the area. Figure 19 describes 
TMSI allocation/reallocation process where A5 is ciphering algorithm and Kc is 
ciphering key. 
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Figure 13. Ciphering Key (Kc) Generation  (Margrave). 
 
4.1.4. Cryptographic Algorithm for GSM 
A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3 are currently defined encryption algorithms for GSM. European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a custodian of the A5/4, A5/3 
encryption algorithms for GSM. The A5 algorithms are standardised for mobiles and 
networks globally interoperability. A5/1 and A5/2 are currently supported by all GSM 
phones, but most of the networks use A5/1. 
Specifications of A5/1 and A5/2 have restricted distribution but the details of the 
algorithms have been discovered and some cryptanalysis has been published. 
COMP128 is hash function which is an implementation of the A3 and A8 algorithms in 
the GSM standard. This algorithm provides the authentication and security 
identification of the subscriber on the network. 
4.2. General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is a data network architecture which is designed 
to integrate with existing GSM networks and offer mobile subscribers “always on” 
packet switched data services to corporate networks and the Internet. GPRS has own 
core network and this core network is attached to the GSM radio network via an open 
interface. “GSM may utilize the GPRS core network to achieve more efficient 
performance and the GPRS user may use some of the GSM supplementary services. 
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However, it is possible to build a GPRS network which is not attached to any GSM 
network. In that case the GPRS network needs its own radio network” (Huovinen 2007). 
4.2.1. Architecture of GPRS 
GPRS tries to reuse maximum of the existing GSM network elements, but some new 
network elements, interfaces, and protocols are required to efficiently build a packet-
based mobile cellular network. Figure 14 summarizes, GPRS requires network 
elements: 
GPRS Mobile Stations: To use GPRS services new Mobile Stations are required 
because existing GSM phones do not handle the enhanced air interface or packet data.  
GPRS Base Station Subsystem: One or more Packet Control Units (PCUs) installation 
and a software upgrade are required by each BSC. Physical and logical data interface to 
the BSS (for packet data traffic) are provided by PCU. The BTS can also require a 
software upgrade but not necessarily require hardware enhancements. 
GPRS Support Nodes (GSNs): There are two GSNs known as Gateway GPRS Support 
Node (GGSN) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN). 
Gateway GPRS support node (GGSN): “The GGSN acts as an interface and a router to 
external networks. The GGSN contains routing information for GPRS mobiles which is 
used to tunnel packets through the IP based internal backbone to the correct Serving 
GPRS Support Node. The GGSN also collects charging information connected to the 
use of the external data networks and can act as a packet filter for incoming traffic” 
(Tutorials point  2014). 
Serving GPRS support node (SGSN): “The SGSN is responsible for authentication of 
GPRS mobiles, registration of mobiles in the network, mobility management, and 
collecting information for charging for the use of the air interface” (Tutorialspoint 
2014). 
GPRS Backbone: “This is an IP based network used to carry packets between different 
GSNs. Tunneling is used between SGSNs and GGSNs, so the internal backbone does 
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not need any information about domains outside the GPRS network. Signalling from a 
GSN to a MSC, HLR or EIR is done using SS7” (Tutorialspoint 2014). 
Routing Area: GPRS introduces the concept of a routing area. This is much the same as 
a Location Area in GSM, except that it will generally contain fewer cells. Because 
routing areas are smaller than Location Areas, less radio resources are used when a 
paging message is broadcast. (Tutorialspoint 2014.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Architecture of GPRS (Merakos & Xenakis 2006). 
4.2.2. Threats to GPRS 
From Figure 14, the Gp interface is a logical connection between PLMNs, used to 
support mobile roaming data users. The Gi interface is the first interface which sends 
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MS’s data towards the internet or corporate network, thus it is exposed to public data 
and corporate customers network. Subscribers are then exposed to all of the harms that 
we have today on the Internet including viruses, worms, trojan horses, denial of service, 
attacks, and other malicious network traffic. The basic problem with security threats on 
the Gp interface is the lack of security inherent in GPRS tunneling protocol (GTP).  As 
shown in Figure 14, that Gn interface connects an SGSN and the GGSN of the operator 
and it is exposed to DoS, IP spoofing, privacy and compromise of confidentiality 
threats. Few possible threats on these interfaces and SS7 are following: 
Threats on the Gp Interface: Border Gateway bandwidth saturation, DNS Flood, GTP 
flood , spoofed GTP, PDP context delete and bad BGP routing information are possible 
threats against the availability. Spoofed create PDP context request, spoofed Update 
PDP context request are possible threats against the authentication and authorization. 
Capturing a subscriber’s data session is possible threat against the integrity and 
confidentiality. 
Threats on the Gi Interface: Gi bandwidth saturation, flooding an MSare possible 
threats against availability. Data can be seen by third parties if IP Security or application 
layer security is not being used, so it could be threat against the confidentiality. Data 
sent over public data networks can potentially be changed by intermediaries and it is 
considered as integrity’s threats. The source address of network traffic cannot be relied 
upon for authentication and authorization purposes because the MS or hosts beyond the 
MS can create packets with any addresses regardless of the IP address assigned to the 
MS; and it can be a threat against authentication and authorization. 
Threats on the Gn Interface: A mobile user (authentic or not) may get access to the 
GPRS backbone means may perform DoS, IP spoofing, compromise of confidentiality 
and privacy, etc. User may send massive amounts of data to other users which can be 
cause of over billing. A malicious may masquerade as a legitimate node (i.e., SGSN, 
GGSN). Overload a servicing node or change the servicing contexts. A malicious MS in 
cooperation with a malicious server may perform over billing attacks against an 
authentic MS. The malicious MS hijacks the IP address of the authentic MS and invokes 
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a download from the malicious server. Then, the malicious MS exits the session and the 
legitimate MS receive the unwanted traffic. 
Threats on SS7: If an attacker gets access to the GPRS backbone s/he may also gain 
access to the signalling part of the network to listen to critical information and these 
critical information can be IMSI, TMSI, location information, authentication 
information, billing data, etc. Perform DoS attacks against the signalling nodes, VLR, 
HLR, AuC. Retrieve sensitive information that the signalling nodes possess, such as it 
returns valid authentication triplets. 
(NetScreen Technologies Inc. 2002:5-8; Merakos et al. 2006; Perez & Pico 2011: 18-
19.) 
4.2.3. Security in GPRS 
GPRS implements a new set of security mechanisms along with GSM security 
mechanisms. GSM security mechanisms have been modified to fulfil the requirement of 
the packet-oriented traffic nature and the GPRS network components. To protect the 
network against unauthorized access and to protect the privacy of users are primary 
concerns of GPRS security architecture and it includes following components regarding 
these concerns. 
Subscriber Identity Module – SIM: The mobile subscriber is subscribed with her/his 
own personalized unique smart card, is known as subscriber identity module (SIM). The 
SIM card authenticates the user by personal identity number (PIN). Identification of the 
user over a network is done by some keys, and the protection of user’s data is done 
through cryptography. To achieve these functions it contains a set of security objects 
including: a (4-digit) PIN code, which is used to lock the card preventing misuse; a 
unique permanent identity of the mobile user, known as IMSI, secret key, Ki, (128 bit) 
that is used for authentication; and an authentication algorithm (A3) and an algorithm 
that generates encryption keys (A8). Since the SIM-card of a GSM/GPRS subscriber 
contains security related sensitive information so it should be manufactured, catered, 
distributed, and managed in trusted environments. 
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Subscriber IdentityAuthentication: Authentication for user in GPRS is similar as in 
GSM.  But in GPRS it is executed from the SGSN instead of the MSC as it can be seen 
from Figure 14. Additionally, the authentication procedure performs the selection of the 
ciphering algorithm and the synchronization for the ciphering. Authentication 
mechanism uses "authentication triplets" which are received from the HLR/AuC and 
stored into the SGSN.  
Authentication triplets consists of random numbers (RAND) between 0 and 2128-1, 
signed response (SRES) which is result of the A3 algorithm used for subscriber 
authentication, ciphering key (Kc) which is computed using the A8 algorithm and it is 
used by the GPRS Encryption Algorithm (GEA). (Huovinen 2007.) 
The first two values from authentication triplets are used as a challenge/response 
mechanism to authenticate the smart card in the MS as smart card has right key Ki 
which is related with IMSI. The Kc is used to encrypt all the data between MS and 
SGSN. Computation of GPRS-Kc and SRES are based on authentication algorithm 
A3/8 and RAND. For each operator, this authentication algorithm may be individual. 
The authentication triplets are sent to the SGSN, which sends RAND to the MS. The 
MS then use the same authentication algorithm A3/8 to calculate SRES and GPRS-Kc. 
SERS is sent back to the SGSN, which compares the SRES, returned to it, and the 
SRES in the authentication triplets. If they are identical, then MS must have the right 
authentication algorithm A3/8 and Ki. Both the MS and the SGSN also have GPRS-Kc, 
and both use this key to encrypt the session between MS and SGSN. Figure 15 clearly 
describes the authentication and key establishment process. If the MS does not have Ki 
or authentication algorithm, then it can’t calculate Kc and unable to do encryption. 
(Brookson 2001.) 
Subscriber Identity Confidentiality: It means that a subscriber should have privacy and 
the identity of user as an IMSI should be confidential when a user is in radio 
communication. So user’s IMSI needs to replace by a temporary identity which is 
known as Temporary Logical Link Identifier (TLLI). This TLLI is accompanied by a 
routing area identity (RAI) to avoid the confusions. The relationship between the TLLI 
and IMSI is saved in database of GPRS. 
56 
 
User and Signalling Data confidentiality: User’s data and a 64-bits ciphering key 
GPRS-Kc is established by A3/8 algorithms as in GSM. Synchronization is performed 
by a ciphering key sequence number (GPRS-CKSN) and synchronization is ensured by 
ensuring the GPRS encryption algorithm (GEA).  
 
 
 
Figure 15. GPRS Authentication and Key Establishment (Brookson 2001). 
 
4.2.4. GPRS Backbone Security 
Mobile operators are responsible for backbone inter-network communication security. 
They deploy private IP addressing and network address translation (NAT) to restrict 
unauthorized access to the GPRS backbone. Unauthorized penetrations for backbone 
might be protected by applying firewalls at the borders of the GPRS backbone. 
Firewalls protect the network by enforcing security policies. By using security policies 
the GPRS operator may be able to restrict traffic in order to protect the MS and the 
network elements from external attacks and to protect the MS from receiving 
unrequested traffic. 
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4.2.5. Cryptographic Algorithm for GPRS 
There are seven GPRS encryption algorithm (GEA) mentioned in the GPRS 
specification. Two of them GEA1 and GEA2 have been defined by ETSI’s working 
group security algorithms group of experts (SAGE). (Brookson 2001.) 
4.3. Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
The UMTS is evolved version of GSM network through GPRS. The GSM network 
using Circuit Switched (CS) technique for voice communication while GPRS uses 
Packet Switched (PS) technique by having some additional nodes such as SGSN and 
GGSN. “The UMTS, incorporating GPRS nodes and UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access 
Network (UTRAN), provides both circuit switched and packet switched services with 
enhanced multimedia applications” (Khan & Ullah 2010). 
4.3.1. Architecture of UMTS 
A UMTS network comprises of three interacting domains; user equipment (UE), UMTS 
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) and Core Network (CN) as shown in 
Figure 16. The basic CN architecture for UMTS is based on GSM network with GPRS. 
All equipment has to be modified for UMTS operation and services. The UTRAN 
provides the air interface access method for User Equipment. Base Station is referred as 
Node-B and control equipment for Node-B's is called Radio Network Controller (RNC). 
User Equipment (UE) interfaces with the user and consists of Mobile Equipment (ME) 
and UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). ME is the single or multimode terminal 
used for radio communication and USIM is a smart card that holds the subscriber 
identity, subscribed services, authentication and encryption keys. UMTS UE can 
operate in either PS and CS modes or only packet switch mode or only circuit switch 
mode of operation. 
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UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) provides the air interface access 
method for User Equipment and handles all radio related functionality with WCDMA 
radio interface standard. UTRAN comprises of Node-B and Radio Network Controller 
(RNC). Node-B is equivalent to BTS in GSM/GPRS and responsible to for radio 
transmission/reception in one or more cells to/from the UE. It performs and reports 
radio measurements to the RNC. It also performs the air interface processing such as 
channel coding, rate adaptation, spreading, synchronization and power control.  
Radio Network Controller (RNC) is like a BSC in GSM and responsible for the 
integrity of the radio resource within  Radio Network Subsystem (RNS) management 
and control of the Node B’s. Radio resource control, admission control, channel 
allocation, power control settings, handover control, macro diversity, ciphering, 
segmentation/reassembly, broadcast signalling and open loop power control are 
functions for RNC. 
Core Network (CN) architecture for UMTS is based on GSM network with GPRS.    
The main function of the core network is to provide switching, routing and transit for 
user traffic. Core network also contains the databases and network management 
functions. Following are components of CN: 
Home Location Register (HLR) is database located in the user’s home system that 
stores the master copy of the user’s service profile and the location of UE on the level of 
MSC and SGSN. 
Mobile Switching Center/Visitor Location Register (3G MSC/VLR) are switch and 
database that serves the UE in its current location for CS services. The MSC function is 
used to switch the CS transactions, and VLR function holds a copy of the visiting user’s 
service profile, as well as more precise information on the UE’s location within the 
serving system. 
Gateway MSC (3G GMSC) is switch at the point where UMTS is connected to external 
CS networks. All incoming and outgoing CS connections go through GMSC. 
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Figure 16. UMTS Architecture (Tipper 2009). 
 
Serving GPRS Support Node (3G SGSN) is similar to that of MSC / VLR but is used 
for Packet Switched (PS) services. The part of the network that is accessed via the 
SGSN is often referred to as the PS domain. Upgrade version of serving GPRS support 
node. 
Gateway GPRS Support Node (3G GGSN)is a connection point between a cellular and 
IP network, which supports 3G networks and other mobile data use by providing access 
to private and Public Data Networks (PDNs). It is upgraded version of gateway GPRS 
support Node. (Tipper 2009.) 
4.3.2. Threats to UMTS 
Threats and attacks against UMTS can be categorized at two levels: one is at UTRAN 
and another is at core network (CN). In UMTS architecture the radio interfaces between 
terminal and SN are intending to have threats. The threats related to attacks on radio 
interface are unauthorized data access, threat against integrity, denial of service and 
unauthorized service access. Core network traffic between RNCs, MSCs and other 
networks is not ciphered. MSCs have lawful interception capabilities and access to call 
data records by design. All switches have to have security measures against unlawful 
access. Many threats against communication between UMTS network are similar to the 
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threats against on the application layer communication. Threats and attacks against 
UMTS along with proposed solutions are following: 
Denial of service: User de-registration request spoofing, and it can be avoided by 
implementing integrity protection of critical signalling messages. By doing this, the 
serving network verifies the de-registration request for integrity and replay. Location 
update request spoofing can be avoided by protecting location update request against the 
replay and modification. Camping on a false BS/MS can be avoided by implementing 
the integrity protection of critical signalling messages. It protects against the denial of 
service to some degree, as the intruder can’t modify signalling messages. 
Identity catching: Passive identity catching can be avoided by the using of temporary 
identities since the impostor has to wait for a new registration or a mismatch in the SN 
database in order to capture the user’s permanent identity in clear text. 
Impersonation of the network and thereby eavesdropping: 
By suppressing encryption between the target user and the true network: can be avoided 
by the data authentication and replay protection of a mandatory cipher mode command 
and it allows the mobile to verify that security has not been suppressed. 
By forcing the use of a compromised cipher key: SRNC includes the security 
capabilities of the MS in a mandatory security mode command. This information lets 
the MS know that the security capabilities are intact. The MS informs the SN about the 
unbroken security capabilities in a security mode complete message, leaving the 
impostor in trouble. 
Impersonation of the user: 
By the use of a compromised authentication vector & hijacking outgoing calls in 
networks with encryption disabled:  It can be avoided by the presence of a SQN in the 
challenge helps safeguard against forced re-use of a compromised AV. 
Hijacking outgoing calls in networks with encryption enabled: The presence of a SQN 
in the challenge protects against multiple use of an AV. 
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Hijacking incoming calls in networks with encryption disabled: The impostor cannot 
turn off the encryption. Integrity protection of signalling messages at each new RRC 
connection establishment between MS and VLR/SGSN is mandatory which allows the 
SN to verify that the request is authentic. 
Hijacking incoming calls in networks with encryption enabled: Connections accept 
message is integrity protected which allows the SN to verify its validity. This means 
that the impostor cannot accept a connection on behalf of the target user. After the 
initial connection establishment, periodic integrity protected messages are exchanged 
during the connection which protects against hijacking of un-ciphered connections. 
(Bais, Palensky & Penzhorn 2006.) 
4.3.3. Security in UMTS 
Infrastructure of security in the UMTS is built on security infrastructure of GSM. “The 
access security features in UMTS are a superset of those provided in GSM” (Boman, 
Horn, Howard & Niemi 2002). UMTS authentication objectives are to provide 
authentication of user to network and vice versa, to establish a cipher and integrity keys, 
to assure user that these keys were not used before over the network, to take care of 
intersystem roaming and handover. 
According to 3GPP TS 21.133, the security architecture is categorized as: 
Network access security: assures confidentiality of user identity (including user and 
signalling data), integrity protection of critical signalling data, authentication of user 
and network, and identification of ME. 
Network domain security: allows nodes in the operator’s network to securely exchange 
signalling data, and protects against attacks on the wire line network). 
User domain security: secures access to mobile stations (by ensuring only authorized 
access to USIM). 
Application domain security: “enables applications in the user and provider domains to 
securely exchange messages” (Boman et al. 2002). 
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Visibility and configurability of security: “informs the user whether a security feature is 
in operation and if the use and provision of services should depend on the security 
feature” (Boman et al. 2002). 
4.3.3.1. Security in UTRAN 
UMTS has introduced mutual authentication between the UMTS subscribers, 
represented by a smart card application known as the universal subscriber identity 
module (USIM), which extends authentication mechanism of subscriber and network. 
Mutual authentication is included Home Environment (HE) and AuC, Serving Network  
(SN) with VLR and USIM (see Figure 17).  
 
 
Figure 17. Security Architecture of UMTS (Martin, Pütz & Schmitz 2001). 
 
Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement uses challenge/response mechanism, the SN 
checks the subscriber’s identity (as in GSM) and at the same time the USIM checks that 
SN has been authorized by the home network.  A permanent secret master key K with 
128-bits length, shared between the user’s USIM and the HE is the significant parameter 
of the authentication mechanism. The key K is never transmitted over the network and 
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the user has no knowledge of his/her master key. In the mean while temporary keys 
with 128-bits length for encryption and integrity checking are derived. New keys are 
derived from the master permanent key K during every authentication process. “It is a 
basic principle in cryptography to limit the use of a permanent key to a minimum and 
instead derive temporary keys from it for protection of bulk data” (Abid & Sulistyo 
2002). 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) “is based on the assumption that the AuC of 
the user's home environment and the user's USIM share a user specific secret key K, 
certain message authentication functions f1, f2 and certain key generating functions f3, 
f4, f5” (Martin et al. 2001). UMTS AKA is comprised of generation of Authentication 
Vectors (AV) and AKA mechanism. 
“The key concept in the authentication vector computation is a one-way function. Five 
f1, f2, f3, f4 and f5 are one-way functions used to compute the authentication vector. 
From  f2 to f5 take user’s permanent secret master key K and an unpredictable challenge 
random number RAND as input parameters and on other hand f1 takes four input 
parameters: K, RAND, sequence number SQN and an administrative Authentication 
Management Field (AMF). The HE/AuC starts with generating a fresh SQN and RAND 
after receiving an authentication data  request from SN i.e. SGSN/VLR. And the 
HE/AuC keeps track of a SQNHE counter for each user. In result, HE/AuC computes the 
following values (see Figure 18): 
A message authentication code 
56	  	<)#	.=>	;;	?6>%	;;	65@    (11) 
Where f1 is a message authentication function 
An expected response  
A? .	  	<*#	?6>%)     (12) 
Where f2 is a (perhaps truncated) message authentication function 
A cipher key 
#+	  	<B#	?6>%)     (13) 
64 
 
Where f3 is a key generating function 
An integrity key  
#-	  	<C#	?6>%     (14) 
Where f4 is a key generating function 
An anonymity key  
#6	  	<D#	?6>%     (15) 
Where f5 is a key generating function  
Finally the authentication token is constructed 
6EF>	  	.=>	 G 	6#	;;	65@	;;	56    (16) 
In equation (16) KA is an anonymity key used to conceal the sequence number as the 
latter may expose the identity and location of the user” (Martin et al. 2001). The AUTN 
and RAND are sent to the user by the SN. UMTS authentication vector (RAND, XRES, 
Kc, Ki, and AUTN) is sent to the SN by the HE. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Generation of Authentication Vectors (AV) (3GPP TS 33.102). 
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The serving network triggers the AKA mechanism by selecting next unused AV from 
ordered AV array in SN database. This AV node used on first in first out (FIFO) order. 
The SN sends RAND and corresponding AUTN to USIM from the selected AV node. 
Authentication mechanism is based on identification process by SN. And identification 
is done by transmitting user’s permanent identity (IMSI) or temporary identity (TMSI) 
to SGSN/VLR. Next to this SGSN/VLR sends an authentication data request to the 
AuC in the HE. AuC can generate the authentication vectors (AV) on the behalf of 
IMSI information and holds master keys of users. These AVs are sent back to 
SGSN/VLR in the authentication data response. This complete process is very well 
summarized in Figure 19. 
One AV is needed for each authentication instance in the serving network 
(SGSN/VLR). The SN sends a user authentication request to the terminal, containing 
parameters RAND and AUTN from the AV. “These parameters are transferred into 
USIM that exist inside a tamper-resistant environment, i.e. in the UMTS IC Card 
(UICC)” (Abid, Sulistyo & Najib 2009). The USIM conducts the computation with the 
stored master key K and RAND and AUTN in the same way of generation of AV in 
AuC. After computation, USIM verifies whether the parameter AUTN was indeed 
generated in AuC; if it is a YES case, then computed parameter RES is sent back to SN 
in the user authentication response. And at this stage SN is compares user response 
RES with the expected response XRES which is part of the AV. Upon right matching 
the authentication ends positively. 
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Figure 19. Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) in UMTS (3GPP TS 33.102).  
 
 
Figure 20. USIM Authentication Function (3GPP TS 33.102). 
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From Figure 20, the USIM computes anonymity key (see equation (15) ) and retrieves 
the sequence number. 
HIJ	  	 	HIJ	 G KL 	G KL    (16) 
 
Where SQN is a sequence number and KA is same as in equation (15). 
Then computes expected MAC by computing already defined parameters in above 
stated equations, 
 
XMAC = f1K (SQN || RAND || AMF)     (17) 
 
And later on compares XMAC with MAC. If MAC and XMAC are different, then user 
sends user authentication reject back to the SN to terminate the process. “If the MAC 
verified successfully, the USIM verifies that the received sequence number SQN is in 
the correct range” (Martin, Pütz & Schmitz 2001). If the USIM finds SQN is in 
incorrect range then it sends a synchronizations failure message back to the SN and 
USIM terminates the process. “The SN then requests fresh authentication vectors from 
the HE by transferring the synchronization failure message back to the HE. If the SQN 
is in the correct range then the USIM computes response includes this parameter in a 
user authentication response back to the SN.  
RES = f2K (RAND)      (18) 
Where RES is response and rest of parameters have been already defined in above 
stated equations. 
Finally the USIM computes the cipher and integrity keys (see equation (13) & (14)). 
Upon receipt of the user authentication response the SN compares RES with the 
expected response XRES from the selected authentication vector. If XRES equals RES 
then the authentication of the user has passed. The SN also selects the appropriate 
cipher key Kc and integrity key Ki from the chosen authentication vector” (Martin et al. 
2001). And authentication ends positively. 
 
Temporary Identities: With the assumption of being user identified in the serving network 
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by IMSI already. Then the SN allocates a temporary identity (TMSI or P-TMSI) for the 
association between the permanent identity and the temporary identity. These identities are 
locally allocated and each SN makes sure to avoid the redundancy of these. User gets this 
TMSI once the encryption is begun and this used in both uplink and downlink signalling 
until a new TMSI/P-TMSI is allocated by the network. SN removes old temporary identity 
after the allocation of new temporary identity. “If allocation acknowledgement is not 
received by VLR/SGSN it shall keep both the old and new P-/TMSIs and accept either of 
them in uplink signalling. In downlink signalling, IMSI must be used because the network 
does not know which temporary identity is currently stored in the terminal. In this 
case,VLR SGSN tells the terminal to delete any stored TMSI/P-TMSI and a new re-
allocation follows” (Abid et al. 2009). 
4.3.3.2. Confidentiality (f8)   
Ciphering in the access network occurs once user and network are authenticated by each 
other then there is secure communication. From mutual authentication and AKA 
section, it is known that there is a shared cipher key Kc between the core network and 
the terminal after a successfully authenticated. “The ciphering function is performed 
either in the radio link control (RLC) sub layer (for non-transparent RLC mode) or in 
the medium access control (MAC) sub layer (for transparent RLC mode)” (Boman et al. 
2002). From Figure 21, it is clearly seen that ciphering algorithm is f8 to encrypt 
plaintext.  Here  plaintext (MAC SDU) is added bit-by-bit to random looking mask data 
(KEYSTREAM BLOCK), which are generate based on following parameters: the 
cipher key Kc with 128-bits length, the time-dependent input COUNT-C with 32-bits 
length, the bearer identity BEARER, the direction of transmission DIRECTION; and 
the length of the required key stream LENGTH. And final encryption is a very fast bit 
operation. This type of encryption has advantage that the mask data can be generated 
even before knowing the actual plaintext. “The decryption on the receiving side is done 
in exactly the same way since adding ask bits twice has the same result as adding 
zeroes” (Abid et al. 2009). 
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Figure 21. Stream Cipher (Abid et al. 2009). 
 
4.3.3.3. Integrity (f9) 
Integrity Protection of Signalling Traffic: Integrity protection is to authenticate 
individual control messages and is implemented in ME and RNC for user and network 
respectively. For each individual signalling message, an MAC function is applied to at 
the RRC layer. Integrity protection is a one-way function controlled by the secret key 
Ki. The integrity key Ki is generated during the mutual authentication and AKA 
mechanism and is transferred to the RNC with Kc in security mode command. From 
Figure 22, we can see that integrity algorithm f9 to authenticate the data integrity of an 
RRC signalling message with output MAC-I. The input parameters to the algorithm are: 
integrity key Ki with 128-bits length, integrity sequence number (COUNT-I) with 32-
bit length and a random value generated by the radio network controller (FRESH) with 
32-bit length, both provide replay protection, direction identifier (DIRECTION) to 
prevent reflection attacks and the RRC signalling message content (MESSAGE). Cipher 
data MAC-I can be influenced unpredictably if there is any change occurs in the input 
parameters. 
For decryption, the receiver computes an expected MAC-I (XMAC-I) in the same way 
as the sender computed MAC-I. And verifies the data integrity of the message by 
comparing XMAC-I to the received MAC-I. This feature also provides the 
authentication of origin of data. 
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Figure 22. Message Authentication Code (MAC) (Boman et al 2002; Abid et al. 2009). 
 
4.3.4. Security in Core Network (CN) 
In CN, the traffic between RNCs and MSCs and other networks is not encrypted and 
also the earlier used ciphering keys are transmitted between networks. Operators can 
protect their core network transmission links. 
4.3.4.1. Securityin Network Domain (NDS) 
“In UMTS Release 99 the core network structure is much like that in  GSM and that is 
why no major enhancement where done in the security of traffic between core 
networks” (Abid et al. 2009). To address these problems, the CN structure evolves and 
IP becomes the dominant protocol on the network layer. IPsec protocol provides 
protection for traffic of network domain by ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of 
communication in the IP layer. By using IP Sec, interacting parties are able to 
authenticate each other. But there is still an issue of generating, exchanging and 
distributing of keys; those are required by confidentiality and integrity algorithms for 
key management. (Abid et al. 2009.) 
4.3.4.2. Securityin Core Network Protocols 
GSM uses mobile application part (MAP) and the CAMEL application part (CAP) for 
signalling between different network elements.  MAP/CAP is running application over 
the SS7 protocol stack. According to 3GPP’s TS 29.002 specification the UMTS retains 
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evolved GSM core network and its protocols, having consideration that SS7-based 
transport stack for MAP will be gradually replaced by IP-based transport stack.  But 
there were few difficulties to do so. Therefore to avoid these difficulties it was decided 
to add a purely IP-based protocols along with MAP and CAP, called GPRS Tunneling 
Protocol (GTP). (Martin et al. 2001.) 
4.3.4.3. Security in MAP 
MAP secured message is composition of  MAP message header, security header and the 
protected payload. MAP security (MAPsec) provides the confidentiality and integrity of 
MAP operations in three different modes. Confidentiality and integrity are guaranteed 
in protection mode 2 of MAPsec, while only integrity is ensured in protection mode 1. 
And there is no protection at all in protection mode 0. The security header is transmitted 
in clear-text during all three protection modes. To implement the confidentiality, the 
payload of original MAP operation is encrypted and s security header is added to show 
the decryption. To implement the integrity, “a MAC is calculated over the clear-text 
payload of the original MAP operation and the security header. A time variant 
parameter is used to protect against replay attacks. The security association for MAPsec 
are created using IKE protocol. This is done with dedicated key management entities 
called Key Administration Center (KAC), which negotiate key on behalf of all other CN 
elements in the same network. Integrity of data, authentication of origin of data, 
protection against replay and confidentiality (optional) are provided by MAPsec. “The 
following interfaces are defined MAPsec. 
 
Zd-interface: is used to negotiate MAPsecsecurity associations (SAs) between PLMNs. 
The traffic over Zd consists only of IKE negotiations. The negotiated MAPsec SAs are 
valid on a PLMN to PLMN basis. 
Ze-interface: is located between MAP-NEs and a KAC from the same PLMN. This 
interface is used for transport of MAPsec SAs and the relevant security policy 
information from the KAC to the MAP-NE. 
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Zf-interface: is located between MAP-NEs. The MAP-NEs may be from the same 
PLMN or from different P. The MAP-NEs use MAPsec SAs received from a KAC to 
protect the MAP operations. The MAP operations within the MAP dialogue are 
protected selectively as specified in the applied MAPsec protection profile. The 
interface applies to all MAPsec transactions, intra- or inter-PLMN” (Abid et al. 2009). 
4.3.4.4. Security in IP-Based Protocol 
The UMTS network domain control plane is sectioned into security domains, which 
typically coincides with the operator borders. Security gateways (SEGs) are entities at 
the borders of the IP security domains used for securing native IP-based protocols are 
responsible for enforcing the security policy of a security domain towards other SEGs in 
the destination security domain. In IPsec-based solution, all controlplanes’ IP 
communication towards external networks goes via SEG. 3GPP defines the minimum 
set of features of IPsec that must be supported for internetworking purposes. These 
simplifications are: only Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) is used for protection of 
packets, while AH is not used at all; ESP is always used in tunnel mode; AES is chosen 
as the encryption algorithm; and IKE is used for key exchange in main mode phase 1 
with pre shared secrets. 
The NDS/IP specification requires SEGs to implement both versions of the Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) protocols (IKEv1 & IKEv2), to allow interworking with SEGs and 
NEs. The specification TS 33.210 describes only the core part that guarantees 
interoperability between different security domains. (Boman el at. 2002.)  
4.3.5. Security in Internetworking between GSM and UMTS 
The key element to handle the interoperation between 2G and 3G with securitycontext 
is different length of keys are being used in these two systems. During 2G 
authentication 64-bits cipher key Kc is used between SIM or USIM and 2G’s SN, while 
on other hand 3G authentication uses 128-bits cipher Kc and integrity Ki keys between 
USIM and SN or HE. In order to make it compatible there are specific conversion 
functions used. Those conversion functions converts or shortens keys length as per 
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requirement. There are basically two scenarios known as UMTS Subscriber Roaming 
(USIM Roaming) and GSM Subscriber Roaming (GSIM Roaming). According to 
3G2000, TR 31.900 there several subcases under these basic scenarios. “There are five 
basic entities involved in these scenarios: the security module, the terminal, the radio 
network, the serving core network and the home network. Each of these entities could 
be classified into either 2G or 3G” (Forsberg et al. 2010: 51-53). 
In Figure 23, there are six important cases described. SIM and GSM BSS, SIM 
application and GSM BSS and SIM and UTRAN B are cases ofGSIM Roaming 
scenario where a SIM is used as an access module. And USIM and GSM BSS, with 2G 
SN, USIM and GSM BSS, with 3G SN and Pure 3G are cases of USIM Roaming 
scenario where USIM is used as the security module and in all cases, both the ME and 
the home network must belong to 3G. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. 2G and 3G internetworking Cases (Forsberg et al. 2010: 53) 
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4.3.6. Cryptographic Algorithm for UMTS 
As we have seen already that the security features of UMTS are fulfilled with a set of 
cryptographic functions and algorithms from f1 to f9. In mutual authentication phase 
there is no standardized algorithm is required and each operator can choose their own.  
MILENAGE is an example for AKA mechanism (f1-f5). A common algorithm called 
KASUMI forms the basis for both the confidentiality algorithm f8 and the integrity 
algorithm f9, which are standardized for use in 3GPP systems. KASUMI is a block 
cipher, which is used in two different operating modes to construct f8 and f9. In traffic 
and signalling encryption phase there is two f8 standard algorithms are UMTS 
encryption algorithm UEA1 derived from KASUMI and UEA2 derived from SNOW 3G 
available. In message authentication phase there are two standard f9 algorithms, UEA1 
derived from KASUMI and UEA2 derived from SNOW 3G available. (Gilbert) 
4.4. Long Term Evolution/System Architecture Evolution (LTE/SAE) 
The term “LTE” comprises the evolution of the UMTS radio access through the Evolved 
UTRAN (E-UTRAN); it is complemented by an evolution of the non-radio aspects 
under the term “System Architecture Evolution” (SAE), which includes the Evolved 
Packet Core (EPC) network. LTE and SAE comprise the Evolved Packet System (EPS). 
EPS uses the concept of EPS carriers to route IP traffic from a gateway in the PDN to 
the UE. Long Term Evolution (LTE) has been designed to support only packet-switched 
services. It targets to provide seamless IP connectivity between UE and the Packet Data 
Network (PDN), during the mobility. A carrier is an IP packet flow with an assured 
Quality of Service (QoS) between the gateway and the UE. The E-UTRAN and EPC set 
up and release carriers as per an application requirements. (Godin & Palat 2009.) 
4.4.1. Architectureof LTE 
On broader level the User Equipment (UE), Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access 
Network (E-UTRAN) and Evolved Packet Core (EPC) are basic building blocks of LTE 
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network. EPC communicates with PDN in the outside world such as the internet, private 
corporate networks or the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). The interfaces between the 
different parts of the system are Uu, S1 and SGi as mentioned in Figure 24. 
User Equipment (UE): The internal architecture of the UE for LTE is identical to 
UMTS/GSM’s ME. The UE comprises Mobile Termination (MT), Terminal Equipment 
(TE) and Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) modules. Those are responsible of 
handling all the communication functions, terminating the data streams and running an 
application known as USIM respectively. A USIM stores user related data such as user's 
phone number, home network identity and security keys’ information; it is quite similar 
to 3G SIM card.  
Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN): E-UTRAN is taking 
care of radio communication between EU and EPC having only Evolved Base Station 
(eNB). In LTE networks mobile communicates with one base station and one cell at a 
time. 
Evolved Base Station (eNodeB/eNB): It sends and receives radio transmissions by using 
the analogue and digital signal processing functions of the LTE air interface and 
controls low-level operations by sending signalling messages to its all mobiles. The 
EPC is connected with eNB via S1 air interface while connected with another eNB via 
X2 interface. And X2 is useful for signalling and packet forwarding during handover. 
The Evolved Packet Core (EPC): it comprises of following components: 
Home Subscriber Server (HSS): is a central database that contains information about 
users’ SAE subscription data, PDNs to which the user can connect and dynamic 
information such as the identity of the MME. 
Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW): communicates with the outside world (i.e. 
PDN) via SGi air interface. Each packet data network is identified by an Access Point 
Name (APN). The P-GW is similar to GPRS’s GGSN and UMTS/GSM’s SGSN. It is 
responsible for IP address allocation for the UE, filtering of downlink user IP packets 
into the different QoS-based bearers and QoS enforcement for guaranteed bit rate 
bearers.  
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Serving Gateway (S-GW): serves as a local mobility anchor for the data bearers (when 
the UE moves between eNBs), serves as a buffer of downlink data (during MME 
paging) and performs some administrative functions in a visited networks. It also retains 
the information about the bearers when the UE is in the idle state.  
Mobility Management Entity (MME): is the control node that processes the signalling 
between the UE and CN. It takes care of Non Access Stratum (NAS) protocols (running 
between UE and CN), bearer management and connection management. 
Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF): this component is not mentioned 
in Figure 24, but it is responsible for policy control and decision-making, control of the 
flow-based charging functionalities, QoS authorization provision.  
The interface between the S-GW and P-GW is known as S5/S8. When the two devices 
are in the same network, there is S5 air interface while they are in different networks 
then there is S8 air interface. 
Non-Access Stratum (NAS): is the functional layer in the UMTS protocol stack 
between the core network and UE. 
Access Stratum (AS): is the functional layer in the UMTS protocol stack between the 
eNB and the UE.  
 
 
 
Figure 24. Architecture of LTE (Choi & Han 2014). 
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4.4.2. Threats to LTE 
Open nature of 4G may cause to expose LTE for threats and attacks. A large number of 
external connectivity points with operators, with third-party applications providers, and 
with the public Internet; contributes to increase the risk in LTE networks. Also, several 
heterogeneous technologies accessing the infrastructure, serve as potential security 
holes in case of lacking of proper implementation of security. In this architecture; 
multiple service providers share the core network infrastructure, so there is always a 
chance of compromise of a single provider, which may cause of collapse of the entire 
network infrastructure.  “Service theft and billing fraud can take place if there are third-
parties masquerading as legitimate ones. New end-user equipment can also become a 
source of malicious attacks, viruses, worms, spam mails and calls, and so on. Specially, 
the Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT), the new spam for VoIP, will become a 
serious problem just like the e-mail spam today” (Park & Park 2007).  
Few more possible VoIP threats are spoofing, data modification, Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) registration hijacking, eavesdropping of private conversation (i.e. 
interception and crypt-analysis of IP packets), and phishing attacks that steal user 
names, passwords, bank accounts, credit cards, and even social security numbers.  
(Park et al. 2007.) 
4.4.3. Security Requirements for LTE 
UMTS networks are already available with confidentiality of user’s ID, authentication 
and confidentiality of User Plane (U-plane) and Control Plane (C-Plane) and integrity 
protection of C-Plane. There are four main requirements for security functions in LTE:  
“Provide at least the same level pf security as the 3G network without affecting user 
convenience. Provide defense against current attacks from the Internet. The security 
function provided to LTE shall not affect the step-wise transition from 3G to LTE. 
Allow continued used of the USIM” (Aono & Zugenmaier 2009). 
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For last and second last requirements are being satisfied by reusing of 3GPP AKA 
mechanism and for LTE core network security requirement can be satisfied by applying 
NDS on IP layer same as 3G. The most important requirement is that LTE must have at 
least same level of security as UMTS. Following new concepts have been introduced to 
address the new and modified features of LTE security.  
• Hierarchical key setup has been introduced 
• Separation between NAS and AS has been introduced 
• Concept of forward security has been introduced to limit the threat due to 
compromised key. 
• Additional security functions have been introduced for interconnection between 
3G and LTE network. 
4.4.4. Hierarchical Key Setup 
As it has been mentioned above that, to enhance the security in EPS, a new key 
hierarchy mechanism is needed. Here is a brief idea of hierarchical key procedure; from  
Figure 25 K is master base key for GSM/UMTS/EPS with 128-bits length. CK and IK 
are cipher and integrity keys derived from master key K with 128-bit length.  KASME is 
base/intermediated key derived from CK and IK during AKA mechanism with 256-bit 
length; this is sent as a part of the EPS AVs from HHS including RAND, XRES and 
AUTN. KeNB is an intermediate key derived from KASME when UE transits to ECM-
CONNECTED states or from K*eNB during handover with 256-bits length. K*eNB is 
derived from KeNB during horizontal handover or from next hop (NH) during vertical 
handover with 256-bits length. NH is an intermediate key derived KeNB from with 256-
bits length to provide forward security. KNASint is an integrity key for NAS signalling 
derived from KASME with 256-bits length. KNASenc is a cipher key derived from KASME 
with 256-bits length. KUPenc is a cipher key derived from KeNB with 256-bits length, is 
used for user plane data protection. KRRCint is an integrity key, derived from KeNB with 
256-bits length. And KRRCenc is a cipher key also derived from KeNB with 256-bits 
length. All EPS security keys are 256 bits in length. Only ciphering and integrity keys 
for AS and NAS algorithms use 128 least significant bits (LSB) of the derived keys. 
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The ciphering and integrity keys are dependent on the algorithms in use. It means, if the 
security algorithms change for any reason, the associated keys must be re-derived. 
(Rumney 2013.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Key Hierarchy (Parsad 2011: 14). 
 
4.4.5. Security in AS and NAS 
The AS and the NAS are two levels of security to ensure confidentiality and integrity 
protection for signalling and user data in the EPS. Signalling and user data 
confidentiality between the UE and the EPS can be done by ciphering mechanism, 
while signalling and user data integrity and be done by integrity and replay 
mechanisms. It is assumed that a large volume of data can be transmitted only when UE 
is in connected state. NAS security associations are established between UE and EPS in 
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MME during idle state. AS security associations are established when UE is connected 
to eNB. We can see in Table 5 that how AS and NAS security are associated and 
related with the UE and EPS network elements, specifically the MME and eNB. 
(Rumney 2013.) 
 
Table 5. AS and NAS Security Association (Rumney 2013).   
Security Association AS NAS 
Termination points UE and eNB (E-UTRAN) UE and MME 
Ciphering (optional) RRC signalling (signalling radio 
bearer) & User plane (data radio 
bearer) 
NAS 
signalling 
Integrity and replay protection 
(obligatory) 
RRC signalling (signalling radio 
bearer). 
NAS 
signalling 
Security protocollayers PDCP  NAS  
Security command procedures RRC  NAS 
 
Note that there is no requirement for data protection for a user plane tunneled between 
the eNB and S-GW above network transport layer. NDS can be used for transport layer 
protection. And integrity and replay protection is not required for user plane transfers 
between the UE and eNB. (Rumney 2013.) 
4.4.6. Security Architecture 
After having an idea of LTE’s architecture, it came to know that SAE/LTE has flat 
architecture, ability of interworking with trusted 3GPP and untrusted non 3GPP 
networks, eNBs are placed in untrusted locations and LTE tries to keep security gaps as 
local as possible. A system needs extended AKA, more complex key hierarchy, more 
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complex interworking security and extra security for eNB as compared to NB, BTS and 
RNC in pervious networks.  
According to quite many tutorial and white papers, LTE’s security can be divided into 
following five levels (see Figure 26): 
“Network Access Security (I): The set of security features that provides the UEs with 
secure access to the EPC and protect against various attacks on the radio link.  
Encryption and integrity protection of RRC and NAS signalling, encryption of data 
radio bearer and mutual authentication between UE and access network are basic radio 
link security features. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. LTE/SAE Security Architecture (3GPP TS 33.401). 
 
Network Domain Security (II): The set of security features that protects against attacks 
on the wire line network and enable nodes to exchange signalling data and user data in a 
secure manner. Mainly DNS performs key negotiation by using IKE, security set up the 
between the SEGs by using Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol (ISAKMP), encryption, data integrity and authentication by using tunnel mode 
ESP. 
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User Domain Security (III): The set of security features that provides a mutual 
authentication between the USIM and the ME before the USIM access to the ME.  
User domain security ensures that ISMI and International Mobile Equipment Identity 
(IMEI) should be confidentially protected; access to the USIM is restricted until the 
USIM has authenticated by provided PIN and if the inserted USIM has a different IMSI 
then mobile equipment should go in emergency call mode only. 
Application Domain Security (IV): The set of security features that enables applications 
in the UE and in the provider domain to securely exchange messages.  
Non 3GPP Domain Security (V): The set of features that enables the UEs to securely 
access to the EPC via non-3GPP access networks and provides security protection on 
the radio access link” (Cao, Li, Luo, Ma & Zhang 2013).  
4.4.7. Security in LTE Cellular System 
As we have seen already in section 4.4.4., that mutual authentication is the most 
significant security mechanism between the UE and CN. In LTE network it has same 
significance and it is required between UE and EPC. To achieve this we will use the 
AKA mechanism with some additional extraordinary features. AKA mechanism 
generates cipher key (CK) and integrity key (IK) for encryption and integrity protection. 
Once an UE connects with EPC over the E-UTRAN, the MME represents the EPC to 
perform a mutual authentication with the UE by the EPS AKA. There several different 
AKA mechanisms are deployed for non 3GPP access. 
From Figure 27, we can see that ESP AKA mechanism have several extraordinary 
features for user access security including Serving Network Identity (SN id) has been 
added to avoid redirection and false base station attacks, at AS level between the UE 
and eNB and at NAS level between UE and MME there are some new security 
functions have been introduced, the new root or master key KASME computed by HHS is 
introduced which will be delivered to the MME or SN, the Key Set Identifier KSIASME
 
is 
attached with the user authentication request message transmitted to the UE by the 
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MME, a new key hierarchy has been introduced to protect the security of the signalling 
and user data traffic (see Figure 25). 
 
 
 
Figure 27. ESP AKA Mechanism (Purkhiabani & Salahi 2012). 
 
For trusted non-3GPP interworking, the UE and the Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting (AAA) server implements the Extensible Authentication Protocol-AKA 
(EAP-AKA) or the improved EAP-AKA (EAP-AKA') to accomplish the access 
authentication. EAP-AKA' comprises a new key derivation function that binds the keys 
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derived within the method to the name of the access network, and employs SHA-256 
instead of SHA-1. “If an UE connects to the EPC over an untrusted non-3GP access 
network, the UE and the ePDG needs to perform the IPsec tunnel establishment and 
further use the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) with EAP-AKA or 
EAP-AKA' to establish the IPSec security associations” (Ma 2010). 
4.4.8. Security in Handover Processes 
The LTE supports two types of handovers known as intra- and inter-MME handovers. 
In the intra-MME scenario handover occurs between the source and target NBs 
managed by same MME via X2 interface (see Figure 24), while in the inter-MME 
scenario handover occurs via the MME without any direct signalling between base 
stations,  here the UE and the MME may decide to run the full EPS-AKA to generate all 
security contexts from scratch. 
Scenario 1: Intra MME Handover 
The current eNB and the target eNB are managed by the same MME: 
As soon as the UE gets connected state, the eNB switches on the AS security context 
with AS security mode command and afterwards, AS security is implemented to all 
communication between the UE and eNB. At this stage MME and UE must generates 
the KeNB and the next-hop (NH) parameter respectively. In the initial setup, KeNB is 
derived directly from master key KASME, and then gets associated with a virtual NH 
parameter with a NH Chaining Counter (NCC) value to be zero. The UE and the eNB 
use the KeNB to secure the communication on the air interface. In this case, a new session 
key K*eNB is used between the UE and the target eNB which is derived from either the 
active KeNB or from the NH parameter. We can see in Figure 28 that a horizontal key 
derivation is showing generation of K*eNB from the existing KeNB while a vertical key 
derivation is showing generation of K*eNB from the NH. E-UTRAN’s Absolute Radio 
Frequency Channel Number-DownLink (EARFCN-DL) and target Physical Cell 
Identity (PCI) are two additional parameters for K*eNB generation along with NH. 
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Scenario 2: Inter-MME Handovers 
 
Mobility between the E-UTRAN and UTRAN/GERAN:  
Handover from the E-UTRAN to the UTRAN/GERAN: In this case the UE and the 
MME first derive a CK' and IK' from the KASME and upon receiving CK' || IK' along 
with key set identifier KSI' from the MME, the target SGSN and the UE shall replace all 
stored parameters CK, IK, KSI, with CK', IK', KSI'. UE and the target SGSN use CK' 
and IK' to derive the cipher key Kc for GPRS. 
 
 
Figure 28. Key Chaining Model for Handover (3GGP TS 33.401). 
 
Handover from the UTRAN/GERAN to the E-UTRAN:  
 
In this case the target MME derives K’ASME  from CK and IK or GPRS KC received from 
the SGSN. The UE shall also execute the above same procedure as the MME to derive 
K’ASME. And the target MME and the UE shall derive KeNB and the corresponding NAS 
keys according to the key hierarchy of LTE (see Figure 25). 
Mobility between E-UTRAN and non-3GPP access networks: 
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There are several different mobility scenarios between heterogeneous access systems in 
the LTE networks, such ash handovers from trusted or untrusted non-3GPP access 
networks to the E-UTRAN and handovers from the E-UTRAN to trusted or untrusted 
non-3GPP access networks. The UE, the target access network and the EPC implement 
a full access authentication procedure before the UE handovers to the new access 
network.  
(Cao et al. 2013.) 
4.4.9. Security in Home NodeB (HeNB) 
A HeNB is known as a Femtocell Access Point (FAP). It is installed by a subscriber in 
residence or small office to increase indoor coverage for voice and high speed data 
service. A HeNBs incorporate the capabilities of a standard eNB. There are closed 
access, hybrid access and open access available for HeNB. A HeNB gets connected to 
the EPC over the Internet via the broad band backhaul. Security features of the HeNB 
are categorized as: HeNB access security, Network domain security, HeNB service 
domain security, UE access control domain security and UE access security domain. 
(Cao et al. 2013.)  
4.4.10. Security in Machine Type Communication ( MTC) 
MTC is the Machine to Machine (M2M) data communication without human 
interaction. The MTC devices can communicate with one/more MTC servers over the 
LTE networks. And can also communicate directly with each other without contacting 
any MTC servers. MME used EPS AKA mutual authentication mechanism to enable the 
secure communication between the MTC device and network.  MTC security 
architecture is divided into following areas.  
Security for the MTC between the MTC device and 3GPP network: such as security 
measurements between the MTC device and RAN, E-UTRAN/UTRAN /GREAM; 
between MTC devices and MME; and between MTC devices and MTC-IWF for 3GPP 
access while ePDG for non 3GPP access. (Cao et al. 2013.) 
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4.4.11. Security in IMS 
The IMS is expected to be a key component of the LTE/SAE architecture. IMS is 
actually overlay architecture to provide the LTE networks with multimedia services. An 
UE needs a new IMS Subscriber Identity Module (ISIM) located within the UICC for 
multimedia services. The IMS authentication keys and functions at the user side are 
stored at the ISIM. Experimental work of this thesis is related to security measurement 
during SRVCC, so background information of IMS and SRVCC are given below. From 
Figure 29: the key elements in the IMS are the SIP proxies, Call Service Control 
Functions (CSCF), which consists of Proxies-CSCF (P-CSCF), Interrogating-CSCF (I-
CSCF) and Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF).  
(Cao et al. 2013.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. IMS Security Architecture (3GPP TS 33.203). 
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4.4.12. Cryptographic Algorithms for LTE 
The 128-EEA1 and 128-EIA confidentiality and integrity algorithms for LTE are 
identical to the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2.  The 
confidentiality algorithm 128-EEA3 is a stream cipher that is used to encrypt/decrypt 
blocks of data under a confidentiality key. The block of data can be between 1 and 232-
bits. The integrity algorithm 128-EIA3 is a MAC function that is used to compute the 
MAC of an input message using an integrity key IK. The message can be between 1 and 
65504-bits. 
The EPS Encryption Algorithms (EEA) are specified in 3GPP TS 33.401 as:.  
"00002" 128-EEA0 Null ciphering algorithm 
"00012" 128-EEA1 SNOW 3G 
"00102" 128-EEA2 AES 
The EPS Integrity Algorithms (EIA) are also specified in 3GPP TS 33.401.  
"00012" 128-EIA1 SNOW 3G 
"00102" 128-EIA2 AES 
EEA0 specifies the null ciphering algorithm, which means that ciphering is not 
activated, hence no confidentiality protection is offered.  
EEA2/EIA2 is based on the AES. The selection of EEA/EIA by AS and NAS may not 
be the same, hence selections are independent. RRC and U-Plane in AS uses the same 
selected EEA for Ciphering. 
(3GPP TS 33.401; ETSI/SAGE V1.7 2011; ETSI/SAGE V1.1 2011 & ETSI/SAGE 
V2.0 2011.) 
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5. SECURITY MEASUREMENTS FOR SRVCC 
LTE networks are being deployed alongside legacy networks (GERAN/ UTRAN/ 
1xRTT), the ability for multimode mobile devices to connect to different network 
technologies is an important part of providing the best possible mobile voice and data 
experience to customers. However, adoption of LTE and its all-IP Radio Access 
Network (RAN) has introduce one of the key challenges of LTE deployment that is 
“delivery of voice services in an all-IP network”. To overcome these challenge, several 
approaches were investigated by the wireless industry including: Voice Over LTE 
(VoLTE), Circuit Switched Fallback (CSFB), Simultaneous Voice and LTE (SVLTE) 
and Voice over LTE via GAN (VoLGA). 
VoLTE was developed by collaboration between over forty operators such as AT & T, 
Verizon Wireless, Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent etc. In 2010, GSMA announced to support 
VoLTE. It allows call continuity with cost, size, and battery efficiency advantages over 
dual radio solutions such as SVLTE. It is based on the IMS network, with voice services 
being delivered as data flows within the LTE data bearer. As a result, SRVCC is 
required in order to execute a seamless handover of a voice call from an LTE network to 
a 3G network and provide continuity for traditional circuit-switched networks. 
According to 3GPP TS 23.216 V8.8.0 specification, “Single Radio Voice Call 
Continuity (SRVCC) refers to the voice call continuity between IMS over PS access and 
CS access for calls that are anchored in IMS when the UE is capable of 
transmitting/receiving on only one of those access networks at a given time”. In simple 
words, it is for handover between a packet call in LTE and a circuit call in a legacy 
system.  
5.1. Architecture of SRVCC 
The simplest architecture of SRVCC is shown in Figure 30. In this figure, “E-UTRAN 
makes the handover decision based on the measurement report from UE and selects the 
target cell. MME for the LTE access-network receives the handover request from E-
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UTRAN with the indication that this is for SRVCC handling, and then triggers the 
SRVCC procedure” (LinYing & WenYuan 2012). The UE indicates its SRVCC 
capability to the MME during the mobility management procedures which in turn 
provides a ‘SRVCC operation possible’ indication to the eNodeB. Whenever an 
SRVCC capable UE is losing LTE coverage, the eNodeB detects it and triggers 
handover procedure towards the MME. MME supports a new Sv interface towards the 
MSC server enhanced for SRVCC, and forwards the SRVCC handover request towards 
the target UMTS/GERAN via the MSC server. The MSC server acts as an Inter 
Working Function (IWF) and prepares the target side for handover. In parallel to the 
target preparation it also triggers session transfer procedure at the Services 
Centralization and Continuity Application Server (SCC AS). The target UMTS/ 
GERAN preparation is completed and the core network performs a handover of the UE 
to the target side by sending a handover command, also the IMS session transfer is 
completed in parallel. The eNodeB needs enhancement in order to prepare appropriate 
information for the target RAN and trigger SRVCC handover. The MME separates the 
bearer carrying voice from other bearers and also signals MSC server about the SRVCC 
handover. The MSC server acts like an IWF and legacy MSCs needs enhancement or a 
new MSC server itself can be deployed. (Paisal 2010.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. SRVCC Architecture (Qualcomm  2012). 
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5.2. Security in SRVCC   
5.2.1. Security Keys Derivation during SRVCC Procedure 
After reviewing SRVCC’s architecture (see section 5.1) and security in handover 
processes (see section 4.4.8.), now in this section we will see that how security keys are 
being derived and used during handover between  E-TRAN and UTRAN-(CS)/GREAN 
with SRVCC approach. 
According to 3GPP TS 33.401 V9.4.0 Release 9: In this procedure, the MME selects the 
current NAS downlink COUNT value for the handover and then increase this stored 
value by 1. The MME and the UE derive a confidentiality key CKSRVCC, and an integrity 
key IKSRVCC from KASME of the current EPS security context and the selected NAS 
downlink COUNT with the help of a one-way key derivation function KDF. The KDF 
returns a 256-bit output, comprising of the 128 MSBs (identified with CKSRVCC) and the 
128 LSBs (identified with IKSRVCC). The MME also provides the 4 LSB of the selected 
NAS downlink COUNT value to the source eNodeB, which then includes the bits to the 
HO Command to the UE. The UE uses the received 4 LSB and its stored NAS downlink 
COUNT to estimate the NAS downlink COUNT selected by the MME. The UE ensures 
that the estimated NAS downlink COUNT has not been used to calculate a CK' and IK' 
in a previous successful or unsuccessful PS or CS (SRVCC) handover. If the estimated 
NAS downlink COUNT is greater than all the estimated NAS downlink COUNTs either 
used by the UE for key derivation in a handover or received in a NAS message that 
passed its integrity check, the UE updates its stored NAS downlink COUNT as though 
it has successfully integrity checked a NAS message with that estimated NAS downlink 
COUNT. And the stored NAS downlink COUNT is never be decreased. UE and MME 
assign the value of eKSI to KSI. MME transfers CKSRVCC, IKSRVCC with KSI and the 
UE security capability to the MSC server enhanced for SRVCC. The MSC server 
enhanced for SRVCC replaces all the stored UTRAN CS key parameters CK, IK, KSI, 
if any, with CKSRVCC, IKSRVCC, KSI received from the MME when the SRVCC 
handover is successful. The UE replaces all the stored UTRAN CS key parameters CK, 
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IK, KSI, if any, with CKSRVCC, IKSRVCC, KSI in both ME and USIM. STARTCS 
complies with the rules in 3GPP TS 25.331. 
5.3. Case Study & Verification of Test Data Sets 
After having the concept of key derivation during SRVCC handover. Here are few 
scenarios, where voice call is being anchored in IMS and mobility is being occurred 
from E-UTRAN to UTRAN(CS)/GERAN, triggered SRVCC. 
5.3.1. Case Study 
Scenario 1: SRVCC handover (also known as inter-RAT) from E-UTRAN to GERAN 
with non lu mode and without Data Transfer Mode/Packet Switched Handover 
(DTM/PSHO) support.  
 
From Figure 31, the source MME is a core node of the LTE network, and a target MSC 
and a target SGSN are core nodes of the GSM network. A MSC server/media gateway 
(MGW) is an interfacing core node between the LTE and GSM networks. The SRVCC 
handover without DTM/PSHO support follows mentioned below steps:  
 
1: E-UTRAN takes decision to trigger the SRVCC handover to the GERAN based upon 
UE measurement reports.  
2: E-UTRAN sends a Handover Required message along with a SRVCC handover 
indication to the MME.  
3: Based upon Quality of Service Class Indicator (QCI) (which is associated with a 
voice bearer) and the SRVCC handover indication, the MME separates the voice bearer 
from non-voice bearers and starts a PS-CS handover procedure for the voice bearer only 
towards MSC Server.  
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Figure 31. SRVCC Handover from E-UTRAN to GERAN (with non-lu mode and       
                  without DTM/PSHO support) (Wu 2010). 
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4: At this stage the MME derives a CK' and an IK' from a KASME stored in the MME and 
a NAS DL COUNT with the KDF (see section 5.2.1) . 
5: Now MME sends a Forward Relocation Request message along with MM context to 
the MSC Server. The MM Context contains the CK', the IK', an eKSI, and UE security 
capabilities.  
6: The MSC Server inter-works the PS-CS handover request with a CS inter-MSC 
handover request by sending a Prepare Handover Request message to the MSC. Here 
the Prepare Handover Request message transfers the security information of the MM 
Context.  
7: MSC derives a GSM ciphering key Kc from the (CK', IK') by applying a conversion 
function c3.  
8: MSC performs resource allocation by exchanging Handover Request/Acknowledge 
messages with the target BSS.  And BSS gets the Kc from the Handover Request 
message.  
9: MSC sends a Prepare Handover Response message to the MSC Server in response to 
the Prepare Handover Request message received in 6.  
10: A circuit connection is established between the target MSC and the MGW 
(associated with the MSC Server).  
11: The MSC Server starts a Session Transfer by sending an Session Transfer Number 
for SRVCC (STN-SR) message towards an IMS. The downlink flow of Voice packets is 
switched towards a CS access leg.  
12: The MSC Server sends a Forward Relocation Response message to the MME.  
13: The source MME sends a Handover Command message to the source E-UTRAN. 
This message includes information about the voice component.  
14: E-UTRAN sends a Handover from E-UTRAN Command message along with CS 
connection configuration.  
15: The UE adjusts with a frequency spectrum of the GERAN system.  
16: According to the CS connection configuration, the UE derives (CKCS, IKCS) from 
the KASME and the NAS DL COUNT with a KDF, and then derives a GSM ciphering 
key Kc from the derived (CKCS, IKCS) key sets by applying the conversion function c3 ( 
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same as in step 7).  
17: And finally the UE performs handover detection at the target BSS.  
 (Wu 2010.) 
 
Scenario 2: SRVCC handover from E-UTRAN to UTRAN with PSHO support. 
 
Refering Figure 32, in this scenario the source MME is a core node of the LTE network 
as like before, and a target RNS and a target SGSN are core nodes of the UMTS 
network. A MSC server/MGW is an interfacing node between the LTE and UMTS 
systems. The SRVCC handover is having the following steps:  
 
1: E-UTRAN takes decision to trigger the SRVCC handover to the GERAN based upon 
UE measurement reports. 
2: E-UTRAN sends a Handover Required message along with a SRVCC handover 
indication to the MME.  
3: Based upon the QCI (associated with a voice bearer) and the SRVCC handover 
indication, the MME starts a PS-CS handover procedure for the voice bearer only 
towards the MSC Server after spliting the voice bearer from non-voice bearers.  
4: MME derives a CK' and an IK' from a KASME stored in the MME and its NAS DL 
COUNT with the KDF (see section 5.2.1)  
5: The MME sends a Forward Relocation Request message along with MM context to 
the MSC Server. The MM Context comprises of the CK', the IK', an eKSI of the MME, 
and UE security capabilities.  
6: The MSC Server inter-works the PS-CS handover request with a CS inter-MSC 
handover request by sending a Prepare Handover Request message towards the target 
MSC. The Prepare Handover Request message transfers the security information 
96 
 
 
 
Figure 32. SRVCC Handover from E-UTRAN to UTRAN with PSHO support (Wu  
                  2010). 
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of the MM Context.  
7: The target MSC sets CKCS to CK' , IKCS to IK' , KSICS to eKSI and  STARTCS to 0.  
8: The target MSC requests resource allocation for the CS relocation by sending a 
Relocation Request message along with new set key values (CKCS, IKCS, STARTCS) to 
the target RNS.  
9: The MME sends a Forward Relocation Request message including the MM Context 
to the target SGSN. The Forward Relocation Request message has only non-voice 
component information.  
10: The target SGSN sets its CKPS to received CK', IKPS to received IK', KSIPS to eKSI 
received and STARTPS to 0.  
11: The target SGSN requests resource allocation for the PS relocation by sending a 
Relocation Request message along with (CKPS, IKPS, STARTPS) to the target RNS.  
12: The target RNS acknowledges the prepared PS relocation by sending a Relocation 
Request Acknowledge message to the target SGSN.  
13: The target SGSN sends a Forward Relocation Response message to the source 
MME.  
14: The target RNS acknowledges the prepared CS relocation by sending a Relocation 
Request Acknowledge message to the target MSC.  
15: The target MSC sends a Prepare Handover Response message to the MSC Server. 
16: A circuit connection is established between the target MSC and the MGW 
(associated with the MSC Server).  
17: The MSC Server starts a Session Transfer by sending an STN-SR message to the 
IMS. Hence the downlink flow of voice packets is switched towards a CS access leg.  
18: The MSC Server sends a Forward Relocation Response message to the source 
MME.  
19: The source MME synchronizes the PS and CS prepared relocations and sends a 
Handover Command message including a NAS DL COUNT to the source E-UTRAN.  
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20: The source E-UTRAN sends a Handover from E-UTRAN Command message to the 
UE.  
21: The UE tunes to a frequency spectrum of the UTRAN system.  
22: The UE derives a CK' and an IK' from its KASME and the received NAS DL COUNT 
with the KDF.  
23: The UE sets both its (CKPS, IKPS, KSIPS) and (CKCS, IKCS, KSICS) to the (CK', IK', 
eKSI), and sets both its STARTPS and STARTCS to 0.  
24: The UE performs handover detection at the target RNS.  
Steps in Figure 32, from 25 to 29 are used for completing the CS relocation, and steps 
from 30 to 32 are used for completing the PS relocation. From step 9 to 11 (in the same 
figure),  the source MME starts relocation of the remaining non-voice PS bearers. 
 (Wu 2010.) 
 
Scenario 3: SRVCC handover from E-UTRAN to GERAN with DTM support. 
 
Refering Figure 33, during SRVCC handover from E-UTRAN to GERAN, the steps 
are almost the same as the steps of the SRVCC handover from E-UTRAN to UTRAN in 
Figure 32. Only the security content is different. Such as, the target MSC derives a 
GSM ciphering key Kc from the (CK', IK') with a conversion function c3 in Figure 33: 
Step7. The target MSC requests resource allocation for the CS relocation by sending a 
Relocation Request message including the GSM ciphering key Kc to the target BSS in 
Figure 33:Step 8. The target SGSN derives a GPRS ciphering key Kc from the (CK', 
IK') with the conversion function c3 in Figure 33:Step10 compared. The UE tunes to a 
frequency spectrum of the GERAN system in Figure 33:Step21. The UE derives its 
own GPRS/GSM ciphering keys Kc from the (CK', IK') with the conversion function c3 
in Figure 33:Step23.  
(Wu 2010.) 
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Figure 33. SRVCC handover from E-UTRAN to GERAN with DTM support (Wu    
                   2010). 
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5.3.2. Integrity and Confidentiality Algorithms for LTE and UMTS  
We have seen that how integrity, ciphering keys and KSI are being derived and 
exchanged during the SRVCC handover in different scenario. In case of IRATs 
handover, if source network is LTE and target network is UMTS/GSM then until 
handover trigger, LTE keys and their ciphering and integrity algorithms are used i.e. 
EIA and EEA. During the handover  the target RAT network keys are generated by LTE 
NAS at UE and CN, and transferred to the target network’s RRC at UE and at network 
side. At the target end, RNC selects UEA and UIA algorithms for ciphering and 
integrity in case of UMTS. Following algorithms are mentioned below for: 
UMTS Integrity: UIA1 (Kasumi), UIA2 (SNOW 3G)  
LTE Integrity:  EIA1 (SNOW 3G), EIA2 ,5(AES), EIA3 (ZUC) 
UMTS Ciphering: UEA0, UEA1 (Kasumi), UEA2 (SNOW 3G)  
LTE Ciphering: EEA0, EEA1 (SNOW 3G), EEA2 (AES), EEA3 (ZUC) 
In experimental work, the operating system is Ubuntu Linux and coding language is 
python. To verify the test data sets, CryptoMobile toolkit has been implemented from 
python 2.6 as wrapper around 3G and LTE encryption and integrity protection 
algorithms and compiled version of C source codes (provided by 3GPP, ETSI, GSMA, 
NIST) as .so files have been used. Test data sets are supposed to be verified according 
to flow chart (see Figure 34). 
5.3.2.1. Input parameters for Integrity & Confidentiality Algorithms 
For understanding of these integrity and ciphering algorithms, we can recall the core 
concept of stream and block ciphering  from sections 3.6.1. and 3.6.2. Because,  Kasumi 
and AES are block cipher while SNOW 3G  and ZUC are stream cipher. 
UMTS’s integrity and confidentiality algorithms have been clearly explained in sections 
4.3.3.2 and 4.3.3. But following is just quick reviw of input parameters for UMTS 
algorithms. 
UEA2 – UMTS Encryption Algorithm: The input parameters are COUNT-C is frame 
dependent on input COUNTC[0]…COUNT-C[31] with 32 –bits length, BEARER is a 
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bearer identity BEARER[0]…BEARER[4] with 5-bits length, DIRECTION is a 
direction of transmission DIRECTION[0] with 1-bit length, CK is Confidentiality key 
CK[0]….CK[127] with 128-bit length, LENGTH is the number of bits to be 
encrypted/decrypted and IBS is input bit stream IBS[0]….IBS[LENGTH-1] with 
LENGTH-bits longer. OBS is an output bit stream OBS[0]….OBS[LENGTH-1] with 
LENGTH-bits longer. 
Initialization: Keystream generator is initialization with the key and initialization 
variables before the generation of keystream bits. Where all variables are 32-bits longer 
and are presented with the MSB on the left hand side and the LSB on the right hand 
side.  
K3 = CK[0] || CK[1] || CK[2] || … || CK[31] 
K2 = CK[32] || CK[33] || CK[34] || … || CK[63] 
K1 = CK[64] || CK[65] || CK[66] || … || CK[95] 
K0 = CK[96] || CK[97] || CK[98] || … || CK[127] 
IV3 = COUNT-C[0] || COUNT-C[1] || COUNT-C[2] || … || COUNT-C[31] 
IV2 = BEARER[0] || BEARER[1] || … || BEARER[4] || DIRECTION[0] || 0 || … || 0 
IV1 = COUNT-C[0] || COUNT-C[1] || COUNT-C[2] || … || COUNT-C[31] 
IV0 = BEARER[0] || BEARER[1] || … || BEARER[4] || DIRECTION[0] || 0 || … || 0 
 
UIA2 – UMTS Integrity algorithm: The input parameters are COUNT-I is frame 
dependent on input COUNT-I[0]…COUNT-I[31] with 32-bits,  FRESH is random 
number FRESH[0]…FRESH[31] with 32-bits, DIRECTION is a direction of 
transmission DIRECTION[0] with 1-bit, IK is integrity key IK[0]…IK[127] with 128-
bits, LENGTH is the number of bits to be ‘MAC’d with 64-bits, MESSAGE is an input 
bit stream with LENGTH-bits. MAC-I is a message authentication code MAC-
I[0]…MAC-I[31] with 32-bits.   
Initialization: 
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K3 = IK[0] || IK[1] || IK[2] || … || IK[31] 
K2 = IK[32] || IK[33] || IK[34] || … || IK[63] 
K1 = IK[64] || IK[65] || IK[66] || … || IK[95] 
K0 = IK[96] || IK[97] || IK[98] || … || IK[127] 
IV3 = COUNT-I[0] || COUNT-I[1] || COUNT-I[2] || … || COUNT-I[31] 
IV2 = FRESH[0] || FRESH[1] || FRESH[2] || … || FRESH[31] 
IV1 = DIRECTION[0] ⊕ COUNT-I[0] || COUNT-I[1] || COUNT-I[2] || … || COUNT-
I[31] 
IV0 = FRESH[0] || FRESH[1] || … || FRESH[15] || FRESH[16] ⊕ DIRECTION[0] || 
FRESH[17] || … || FRESH[31]  
(ETSI/SAGE V 2.1 2009.) 
 
EEA – EPS Encryption algorithm: The input parameters to the ciphering algorithm are 
KEY is a cipher key with 128-bits, COUNT is with 32-bits, BEARER is a bearer 
identity with 5-bits, DIRECTION is the direction of the transmission with 1-bit, and 
LENGTH is the length of the keystream required. The DIRECTION bit shall be 0 for 
uplink and 1 for downlink. 
EIA – EPS Integrity Algorithm: The input parameters are KEY is a integrity key with 
128-bits, COUNT with 32-bits, BEARER  is a bearer identity with 5-bits, DIRECTION  
is a direction of the transmission with 1-bit, and MESSAGE is the message itself with 
LENGTH-bits. The DIRECTION bit shall be 0 for uplink and 1 for downlink.  
Based upon these input parameters the sender computes a 32-bit message authentication 
code (MAC-I/NAS-MAC) by using the integrity algorithm EIA. The MAC is then 
concatenated to the message when sent. The receiver computes the expected MAC 
(XMAC-I/XNAS-MAC) in the same way and verifies the data integrity of the message 
by comparing it to the received MAC-I/NAS-MAC. The stream cipher algorithm ZUC 
with an internal state of 560 bits is initialized from a 128-bit cipher key and a 128-bit 
initialization vector.  (ETSI/SAGE V 2.0 2011.) 
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Figure 34. Flow Chart for Test Data Sets Verification. 
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5.3.2.2. Verification of Test Data Sets According to 3GPP Standards 
All test data sets have been taken from 3GPP standards published in 3GPP technical 
specification, GSMA and ETSI/SAGE. Please see 3GPP TS 35.203, ETSI/SAGE V1.1 
and 3GPP TS 33.401 for test data sets. 
All input parameters are in hexadecimal format for each test case and hardcoded inside 
the testing code. Ciphering and integrity keys are 128-bits longer.  
All test data sets against the Kasumi, Snow 3G, ZUC and AES algorithms have been 
executed by the test code. And it can be clearly seen in Figure 35 that, the result is 
“True” as an output according to flow chart, which means all test data sets have been 
verified. 
Verification of each data sets separately: 
4 test data sets for kasumi and 5 test data sets for kasumi F8 and 5 test data sets for 
Kasumi F9, have been taken from 3GPP TS 35.203 V11.0.0 Release 11. After executing 
each sets of test data the result is “True” as an out put (see Figure 36). It means that 
these test data sets have been verified according to the flow chart. 
From Figure 37.a, 4 test data sets for SNOW 3G, 5 test data sets for SNOW 3G F8 & 
F9 each, 6 test data sets for SNOW 3G EIA1 have been taken from ETSI/SAGE V 1.1 
(2012). These data sets have been verified after execution of code same as above. 
From Figure 37.b, 4 test data sets for ZUC,  5 test data sets for ZUC EEA3 and 5 test 
data sets for ZUC EIA3 have been taken from ETSI/SAGE V 1.1 (2011). These test 
data sets have been verified after execution the code as early mentioned case. 
Figure 37.c, finally 6 test data sets for AES EEA2 and 8 test data sets for AES EIA2 
have been taken from 3GPP TS 33.401 V8.6.0 Release 8. These data sets have been 
verified after execution of testing code. 
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Figure 35. Verification of Test Data Sets for Kasumi, Snow 3G, ZUC & AES. 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Verification of Test Data Sets for Kasumi (F8 & F9). 
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Figure 37. Verification of Test Data Sets 
 
a. For SNOW 3G (F8, F9 &  
    EIA1). 
 
b. For ZUC (EEA3 &   
    EIA3).  
c. For EAS (EEA2 & EIA2). 
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5.4. SRVCC Emergency Call 
3GPP Release 9 has introduced the SRVCC support for emergency calls that are 
anchored in the IMS core network. It must be supported in SRVCC where IMS 
emergency calls are used over IMS VoIP capable radio coverage and afterward is 
attended with the CS radio access. The Emergency Access Transfer Function (EATF) is 
a logical function required in the Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN) in 
addition to the functions needed for SRVCC and IMS emergency calls. The MSC uses 
the Mw interface to the I-CSCF and includes the equipment identifier into the session 
transfer request; the equipment identified is used by the EATF to correlate the call legs 
(see Figure 38). SRVCC for emergency calls does not make use of the Access Transfer 
Control Function (ATCF) and Access Transfer Gateway (ATGW). The MSC can also 
use the ISDN User Part (ISUP) interface to a Media Gateway Control Function 
(MGCF) and then the Mg interface is used between the MGCF and the I-CSCF. It is 
assumed that if ISUP is used, the ISUP extension of carrying the IMEI to the MGCF is 
supported. Support of SRVCC for emergency calls requires support in MME, MSC 
Server, Emergency CSCF (E-CSCF) and EATF. (GSMA IR.64 2012.) 
 
 


Figure 38. SRVCC For Emergency Call (GSMA IR.64 2012). 
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5.4.1. Security in SRVCC Emergency Call 
During the IMS emergency calls, the session data of all calls is stored by the application 
server that is responsible for the VCC functionality until the completion of emergency 
session. It is obligatory to re-generate the security parameters during SRVCC between 
E-UTRAN to UTRAN/GERAN. In case of mobility from E-UTRAN to UTRAN, the 
UTRAN ciphering and integrity protection keys are derived from the EPS security key, 
so there is no need to send confidential security parameters over the radio interface as a 
part of session transfer mechanism. If the authentication has been omitted in E-UTRAN 
because of absence of a valid USIM, “then instead of seeding the key derivation with 
locally created keys for a null algorithm, the already existing UTRAN and GERAN 
practice to omit the security procedure can be used” (Schulzrinne 2013). 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Objective of this thesis is to identify and review security measures in cellular, mobile 
network. The attention is paid to SRVCC procedure along with test data sets 
verification against the integrity and ciphering (UIA, UEA, EIA and EIA) algorithms 
for UMTS and LTE network. 
 
Therefore, the following is presented in the thesis: basic idea of architecture, operation 
and evolution of a cellular network; basic concept of security and an evolution of the 
security measures employed in the cellular networks ranging from 2G to 4G. Also the 
thesis elaborates on the architecture of mobile networks, identification of possible 
threats, vulnerabilities, risks and attacks against the mobile networks. Moreover counter 
measures for the latter, in terms of security architecture of mobile networks including 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity, to protect the whole system are concrete 
pillars of security infrastructure.  
 
When a single radio UE accessing IMS-anchored voice call services moves from the 
LTE network to the circuit switched domain, the SRVCC service for LTE comes into 
the picture. It is capable of transmitting/receiving on one of these access networks only, 
at a given time. SRVCC removes the need for a UE to have multiple RAT capability. In 
this thesis, the review of the scenarios for SRVCC triggered handover is presented, and 
it is concluded that the security configuration of each system can be stored in the USIM 
or the ME of the UE. The UE can transmit a handover complete message to activate 
ciphering/integrity protection with the updated security configuration after the handover 
command is received.  Along with this test data sets have been verified for Kasumi, 
SNOW 3G, ZUC and AES cryptographic algorithms for LTE’s and UMTS’s integrity 
and confidentiality provided by authentic organization with 128-bits ciphering and 
integrity keys.  
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For future work test data sets can be tested with 256-bits ciphering and integrity keys. 
Moreover, security measures for SRVCC procedure have been considered only for 
voice component, in future it might be reviewed for Single Radio Video Call Continuity 
(vSRVCC) that is a network domain handover technology with TV phone service. 
Security assurance methodology for 3GPP network is also an interesting research topic 
in security context. Especially security measures during interworking and 
interoperability between LTE and non-3GPP wireless mobile networks. 
  

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